If history is any guide, India has an extra-ordinary preference for puppet governments in Afghanistan. Both India and Afghanistan were active allies of USSR against the US during the Cold War. Now when the reins of power are again in the hands of another unpopular and foreign-supported regime in Kabul, India is active again to gain some sort of foothold in Kabul. In fact, both India and
Pakistan are trying to outsmart each other for a major chunk of influence in
post-US Afghanistan. Pakistan has a national security objective in having a
decisive say in Kabul; Afghanistan is its immediate neighbor, its backyard.
India is trying to overtake Pakistan for Kabul race precisely for the same
reason; Afghanistan is Pakistan’s immediate neighbor. India has its strategic
interests in Kabul because while in Kabul, it can encircle Pakistan and imperil
its Western borders in order to keep it in line and establish its hegemony in
the region. It has already opened a number of border posts, called consulates,
along Pak-Afghanistan border which are busy pumping money to intensify Pakistan
insurgency and label Pakistan as sponsor of Afghanistan unrest.
India has a
bigger dream to realize through its presence in Kabul. It wants to keep China at
leash by keeping it away from this confluence of cross-roads leading to Central
Asia. It has made heavy investments in building infrastructure in this
war-ravaged country. On this point, the
US and India have converging interests. If the US, therefore, has to make a
choice between India and Pakistan for a suitable heir to Kabul throne, it would
more probably pick India.
The realist
politics are driven by nothing but the selfish national interests and thus, have
very interesting political dynamics. India was an anti-US ally of Soviet Russia
in the Cold War era. It was a bitter critic of the US supporting Afghanistan insurgency
when Communist forces occupied Afghanistan. The then government of Afghanistan,
largely unpopular, was in Soviet camp. India and the then-Afghanistan were
allies. It is for this reason that in that popular revolt against Soviet Russia,
India was opposed to the Mujahideen who were funded and equipped by the CIA.
Look at the irony
of history. Pakistan was a committed US ally in the war against Soviet Russia. Without
Pakistan’s support, Mujahideen could not drive Russian forces leading to
disintegration of Soviet Union, a goal the US wanted to achieve at all costs.
Pakistan has always remained on the right side of the US during the cold war and
paid dearly for that. With the changing scenario, it now finds itself in the woods
after having earned American fury despite fighting US “war on terror” for 10
years. The loss of human lives alone of Pakistanis, branded as collateral
damage, is 4000 military men and 35000 civilians. Such are the ways of
international politics. India, despite having remained aloof, and largely unhurt,
in the war or terror, is now preparing to take the reins of power after the
endgame in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan’s
present government is a replica of the pro-Russia regime of 1970s and 1980s;
unpopular, unrepresentative and supported by the occupation armies. For these
reasons, it needed the political support of USSR and India then and of the US
and India now. The best way to sustain this support is to accuse Pakistan for
anything and everything happening in the country.
It will be
very interesting to look at the Indian interests in Afghanistan as perceived by
Indian analysts. According to an article in Foreign Policy, India is a
significant player in Afghanistan. It has the world's fifth-largest aid program
there, having committed $1.5 billion in developmental assistance. It has played
a key role in reconstruction and has developed training programs for Afghan
civil servants and police. India has made these investments in the country
because its policymakers are keen on ensuring that a radical Islamist regime
does not return to the country, that Pakistan not wields a disproportionate influence on any future government, and that
Afghanistan might serve as a bridgehead for India's economic ties to the
Central Asian states.
India can do
anything to ensure that a representative government does not return to
Afghanistan, if it gives some space to Pakistan to wield some interest in
Afghanistan. According to the article,
India fears that a reconstituted Taliban regime would allow a host of
anti-Indian terrorist groups, most notably Lashkar-e-Taiba, to find sanctuaries
and training grounds in Afghanistan. Some astute New Delhi-based analysts also
worry that a resurgent Taliban may actually help broker a peace agreement
between the Pakistani regime and Pakistani domestic terrorist groups like
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. That, they argue, could redirect the collective
wrath of various jihadi organizations from internecine conflict and focus it on
India, and more specifically Indian-controlled Kashmir. Finally, they are
concerned that a Taliban-dominated regime would forge links with the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan and other jihadi groups in Central Asia, thereby adversely
affecting India's quest for access to energy resources and markets in the
region. Yet New Delhi also sees the writing on the wall but it will not easily
walk away from Afghanistan.
India is counting
on its historic ties to the Northern Alliance, which is a representative body of
Afghanistan’s ethnic minorities and which India opposed in Afghanistan Jihad of
1980s.
According to TIME, with the U.S. looking for an exit,
India is trying to figure out what its role in Afghanistan's uncertain future
will be. U.S. counterinsurgency strategy aims to "clear, hold, build and
transfer" a stable Afghanistan back to its people. The Indian government
hopes to aid the "build and transfer" part of that effort by helping
to develop Afghanistan's infrastructure and institutions.
Whatever New
Delhi does, it can expect truculent opposition from archrival Pakistan, which
has long tried to influence what happens in Afghanistan, primarily to ensure
that the country's power players are friendly to Islamabad. Its suspicion of
India's regional intentions is plainly revealed in several cables released by
WikiLeaks. Pakistan's press routinely accuses India of sending in spies in the
guise of doctors and engineers, and Islamabad claims that India's four
consulates are bases for espionage and for funneling aid to separatist rebels
in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan. Pervez Musharraf, a former Pakistani
President, is convinced New Delhi is responsible for providing insurgents with
weapons. "The Afghans have nothing," he told Time, "so it must
be the Indians."
While
discussing India’s Stake in Afghanistan,
The
Journal of International Security Affairs writes in post 9/11 Afghanistan,
India’s interests have centered on three broad objectives: security concerns,
economic interests and regional aspirations. India has revived its historical,
traditional, socio-cultural and civilizational linkages with the objective of a
long-term stabilization of Afghanistan. As part of this effort, India has
supported the nascent democratic regime, seeing in it the best hope for
preventing the return of the Taliban. India is also looking beyond
Afghanistan’s borders, working to revive Afghanistan’s role as a “land bridge”
connecting South Asia with Central Asia and providing access to strategic
energy resources. Along these lines, India has actively promoted greater trade
and economic integration of Afghanistan with South Asia through the regional
mechanism of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
With
the establishment of an interim government in Afghanistan under President Hamid
Karzai in 2001, India announced that it would provide $100 million in
reconstruction aid to Afghanistan. Since then, India has followed a policy of
high-level engagement—characterized by a range of political, humanitarian,
cultural, economic and infrastructure projects. India today ranks overall as
Afghanistan’s sixth-largest bilateral donor country, having invested heavily in
a range of key sectors of the Afghan economy and pledged to do so to the tune
of $1.3 billion more in the years ahead.
There
is indeed a critical security concern to India’s involvement in Afghanistan,
however—specifically, the possibility of terror emanating from the extremely
volatile Pakistan-Afghanistan border and spilling over into India. A strong,
stable and democratic Afghanistan would reduce the dangers of extremist
violence and terrorism destabilizing the region. Since 9/11, New Delhi’s policy
has broadly been in congruence with the U.S. objectives of decimating the
Taliban and al-Qaeda and instituting a democratic regime in Kabul.
Today,
however, a resurgent Taliban and mounting instability have worsened the outlook
for Afghanistan. In the coming days, India’s “aid only” policy is bound to face
new challenges—and adapt to them. While Delhi resists putting “boots on
ground,” it will need to widen its web of engagement in the rapidly-shrinking
political space in Afghanistan. India must revive its traditional Pushtun
linkages and at the same time re-engage other ethnic groups as it attempts to
strike a balance between continuing support for the Karzai government and
increasing its engagement with other factions. By doing so, India will position
itself to influence Afghanistan’s evolving political sphere, and serve as a
serious interlocutor in the intra-Afghan and inter-regional reconciliation
process now underway.
India has no
cultural ties with Afghanistan as being claimed by the Indian analysts.
Afghanistan, a country of Muslims has ethnic ties and cultural similarities
with its immediate neighbors. India is trying hard to ensure continuation of
minority-dominated puppet government in Kabul, like it did in 1970s and 1980s,
as any popular government chosen by majority Pashtuns will not let India achieve
a foothold with the sole objective of using Afghanistan as bridge for its
strategic objectives, regional ambitions and its access to resource-rich
Central Asia.
