RealPolitik: Pakistan reaches out to Russia to change the contours of a unipolar world.....

HUSSAIN SAQIB

When President Putin postponed his visit to Pakistan in 2012, the most jubilant countries were India and the US but it was subsequently revealed that this postponement did not mean anything to lift the spirits of Cold War adversaries now turned into allies. The on-going visit to Russia by Gen Raheel Sharif, Pakistan's most powerful stakeholder is a sufficient indication of realpolitik. Cold War adversaries are switching partners and the events are unfolding so swiftly that it has become difficult to keep track of who will be whose friend after Americans pack up from Kabul and leave. One thing is for sure; foes of yesterday will be compelled by the realities of realist politics of today to switch sides and embrace each other.

Russia of today is the successor of Soviet empire of yester-years, though reduced to much smaller in size. Russia, and then the USSR, which played for centuries the Great Game for gaining influence and foothold in Central Asia and get a direct access to Kabul finally lost the Game to the West in the battlefields of Afghanistan. Along with this defeat, it also lost its imperial glory by ceding a sizable portion of its territory to independent Central Asian States. It, however, seems that it never gave up its ambitions on Afghanistan; it has been watching with amused interest the plight of NATO forces in Afghanistan. It had read the writing on the wall and was confident that NATO would not meet a fate different from what it itself encountered after a decade-long war of 1980s.

Russia under Putin has revived its hope in Afghanistan and is moving to deepen its geo-economic ties with South Asia as a whole, with Pakistan serving as a gateway for energy trade to the entire subcontinent in advance of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan in 2014. Badly bruised by harsh treatment meted out by the Americans, Pakistan feels compelled to look towards not only its old friend China but also its longtime adversary, Russia. If India after having been in the cold during Cold War can warm up to the US, why can’t Pakistan hope to be friends with Russia? This is what the realist politics is all about. For Pakistan, Russia can not only help the civilian government in Islamabad to shore up its economic record, it can also offer an alternative source of military hardware to the country’s armed forces. Diversifying its sources of military supplies has taken on new-found importance for Islamabad given Washington’s increasing reluctance to supply the full spectrum of arms and China’s continued inability to meet all of Pakistan’s requirements.

To understand the potentials of Pak-Russia friendship, we will have to make an assessment of the present state of US-Russia relations. This subject has dominated the foreign policy debates of both the major contenders of power in next presidential elections of the US which are just round the corner. The Obama administration is being harshly criticized by the opponents for its increased focus on its Pacific Century and allocation of future military and political resources to contain China. In their view, Russia under president Putin is a much greater threat to American ambitions than China. According to Foreign Policy, Russia is the major counterweight to American power and influence. A huge country that straddles what the great geographer Halford Mackinder called the Eurasian “heartland” is sure to operate with substantial effect in the world. A country with thousands of nuclear weapons, still-substantial armed services, and a cornucopia of natural resources will have its innings in high politics. Republican presidential candidate, Romney’s assertions about Russia should be seen less as stale strategic thinking and more as a critique of Barack Obama’s looming “Pacific shift,” which implies that China has moved into position as our top geopolitical foe. Yet Beijing, in the throes of modernization and heavily weighed down by a massive population, increasingly urgent energy needs, and a troubled political transition can hardly be seen as new No. 1 geopolitical foe of the US.

According to this analysis, China’s military is still decades away from having any kind of ability to project force over meaningful distances. The 100-mile width of the Taiwan Strait could just as easily be a thousand miles, given China’s lack of force-projection capability. Even the quite large People’s Liberation Army is full of question marks, with few substantive changes evident since it got such a bloody nose during the 1979 war with Vietnam. To be sure, the Chinese navy is very innovative, with its emerging swarms of small, short-ranging missile boats. And Chinese hackers are among the best in the world. But these capabilities hardly form the leading edge of a global military power.

This, by implication, suggests that with Russia’s greater capabilities, and intentions so clearly and so often inimical to American interests, the smart geopolitical move now would be for Washington to embrace Beijing more closely, giving Moscow a lot more to think about on its eastern flank. This was a strategic shift that worked well for President Richard Nixon 40 years ago, when he first played “the China card”; it might do nicely again today.

The present US-China relations do not suggest any potential conflict given the fact that U.S. trade with China amounts to more than half a trillion dollars annually — more than ten times the level of Russo-American economic interaction. And Beijing also serves as a major creditor. It simply makes little sense to provoke China, as Obama’s announced Pacific shift already has. If Romney is right about the return of post-Soviet Russia as the world’s bête noire, then any American Pacific shift should be more about alliance with, rather than alienation of, Beijing.

The Russian stance on the issues of US intervention in Syria for regime-change clearly suggest the divergence of interests of both the countries. With reinstallation of president Putin in Moscow, hopes that Russia will support any American initiative are fading away. According to a report by Brookings, the US has a list of demands which Russia may not accept. These include further reductions of nuclear arms, including non-strategic nuclear weapons; a cooperative NATO-Russia missile defense arrangement; joint efforts to deal with the proliferation challenges posed by North Korea and Iran; and consultation on steps to bolster security and stability in Central Asia as the NATO coalition prepares to withdraw its military forces from Afghanistan. The United States is trying to explore ways to increase trade and investment relations with Russia, which could help build a foundation for a more sustainable relationship.

President Putin’s re-election is considered a major challenge to smooth-sailing from the American point of view. Mr. Putin spent his formative years in the 1980s as a KGB officer. As his rhetoric during the election campaign made clear, he holds a wary skepticism about U.S. goals and policies. For example, his comments suggest he does not see the upheavals that swept countries such as Georgia, Ukraine, Tunisia or Egypt as manifestations of popular discontent but instead believes they were inspired, funded and directed by Washington. This may seem like a paranoiac view, but Mr. Putin has made so many allusions to it that it is hard to conclude that he does not believe it. That is a complicating factor for the bilateral relationship.

According to Brookings, Mr. Putin’s experience as president dealing with the Bush administration was not a happy one. In 2001-02, he supported U.S. military action against the Taliban, including overruling his advisers to support the deployment of U.S. military units into Central Asia; shut down the Russian signals intelligence facility in Lourdes, Cuba; agreed to deepen relations with NATO; calmly accepted the administration’s decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; and agreed to a minimalist arms control agreement that fell far short of Moscow’s desires. In his view, he received little in return. His perception is that Washington made no effort to accommodate Moscow’s concerns on issues such as the future of strategic arms limits, missile defense deployments in Europe, NATO enlargement, relations with Russia’s neighbors in the post-Soviet space or graduating Russia from the Jackson-Vanik amendment.

As against yesterday, Mr. Putin faces a tougher opposition at home. Soviet and Russian leaders in the past resorted to the image of a foreign adversary—all too often the United States—to rally domestic support, and one can see aspects of that in Mr. Putin’s campaign rhetoric. But the constituency to whom that appeals is already largely on Mr. Putin’s side. He may conclude that he can focus better on his domestic challenges if his foreign policy results in more positive relations with countries such as the United States. The upshot is that Mr. Putin’s return can and probably will mean more bumpiness in the U.S.-Russia relationship. He will pursue his view of Russian interests. On certain issues, those will conflict with U.S. interests, and Washington and Moscow will disagree, perhaps heatedly.

In this state of US-Russia relationship, Pakistan sees its opportunity in warming up to Russia after 2014. Despite postponement of much-awaited visit of president Putin to Pakistan,the two significant visits of Pakistan’s army and air chiefs to Russia give some indications of the future Pakistan-Russia relations.

According to an assessment of warming up Pakistan-Russia relations carried out by Reuters, bilateral visits alone don’t transform ties, and especially ones with a troubled history behind them. And then there is India to be factored in, both for Russia and Pakistan.  Moscow has long stood in India’s corner from  the days of the Cold War to its role as a top weapons supplier to the Indian military, still ahead of the Israelis fast clawing their way into one of the world’s most lucrative arms markets. A nuclear-powered submarine has just sailed from Russia to be inducted into the Indian navy - a force-multiplier in the military with the sub’s ability to stay beneath waters long and deep and far from home. But the stepped up Russia-Pakistan diplomacy suggests a thawing of ties at the very least. And at another level, by raising the quality and quantity of these exchanges, is Russia signaling it will pursue a multi-vectored policy in a fast changing South Asia? Tanvir Ahmad Khan, a former Pakistani foreign secretary who was also once the country’s ambassador to Moscow, says the two countries are on the verge of ending a “long history of estrangement” and that two factors have led to this landmark development. One is that there is now a national consensus in Pakistan to engage Russia earnestly, and two, “Vladimir Putin’s Russia has read the regional and global scene afresh and recognized Pakistan’s role as a factor of peace and stability.”

Pakistan’s compulsion to diversify its foreign partners lies in its present ties with the United States which have soured so much that Pakistan can no longer be considered as an ally, ready to do its bidding as in the proxy war against the Red Army in Afghanistan. And India’s ties with the United States, on the other hand, have been transformed, with Washington virtually legitimizing it as the world’s sixth nuclear weapon state, something that even Russia never went as far to support during all the years as close allies. And if India and the United States are holding ever so advanced  joint military exercises (there is one going on now in the Rajasthan desert which has a border with Pakistan) and considering multi-billion dollar defense deals as part of a new booming strategic relationship, Russia and Pakistan are also looking at launching  military exchanges. Last year the commander of the Russian ground forces, Col-Gen Alexander Postinov, was in Pakistan and according to Pakistani newspapers discussed with Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani the possibility of expanding defense ties by holding joint military exercises, exchanging trainees and trainers and selling and buying weapons, although it seems these were to be confined to counter-terrorism equipment.

It may be interesting to know that the 50 JF-17 Thunder fighter planes that China is supplying to Pakistan use a Russian engine, and it’s likely that Russia gave the green signal for China to go ahead. New Delhi was probably not impressed, but it has kept its silence. Russia is also reported to have indicated its willingness to get involved in the 1,640 km TAPI project bringing piped gas from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and into energy-starved Pakistan and India, a project that has been hanging fire for years. Russian investors were also interested in the Thar coal project which involves developing a large energy complex in Sindh province to produce 6,000 MW of coal-based power and introduce to the country the concept of gasification and production of liquid fuel from coal.

The looming Clash of Titans in the Pacific…..

The First World Naval War (FNWW) is around the corner and the battlefield is none other than the South China Sea. The FNWW will be a lot different from the naval wars fought so far between big powers in the last century. The future war will be fought between US and China but the gallant warriors will be replaced by the unmanned vehicles aided by super sensors and driven by artificial intelligence. Strategic location of the war theater has pitched China against its neighbors who are under the US influence. There are phenomenal realignments which could translate into another bi-polar world like the one which came into being post-WWII? Professor Samuel Huntington, in his famous book, Clash of Civilizations...., predicted a war between China and Vietnam sometimes close to 2010 over the maritime resources of South China Sea. In view of Huntington, this would be a war within a civilization; but the later evidence suggests that South China Sea will be a hotbed of a much broader international conflict. Analysts have their fingers crossed but given the economic growth and fast industrialization of China, the world is already on the road to its cherished dream of bipolarity.

The U.S. is not oblivious to the potential conflict and has adopted a new approach to any potential war with China. The U.S. Department of Defense has been told that, for the foreseeable future, there will be no more large-scale land campaigns. The air force, navy, and marines responded with a plan (AirSea Battle) that has been in the work for years. The new strategy is designed to cope with the rising power of China in the Pacific. AirSea Battle involves tighter planning and coordination of navy, marine, and navy forces, plus the development of some new weapons and tactics and cooperation with allies.

AirSea battle concentrates on military operations. But these will be heavily influenced by economic factors. For example, during World War II the United States was a largely self-sufficient “continental power.” That has changed. The U.S. is now like much of the rest of the world, China included. If there were a maritime blockade of China, the U.S. and many other Chinese trading partners would suffer severe economic disruptions. There would be massive unemployment for all concerned and that would happen despite energetic efforts by everyone to find alternative sources to goods no longer available because of the disruption of the China trade.

Let us look at the potential fighting elements. These are unmanned vehicles like UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles), UUVs (Unmanned Underwater Vehicles), and USVs (Unmanned Surface Vehicles) which are radically new technologies. There are already examples of all three in service. There will be more and they will change everything by incorporating more powerful artificial intelligence (AI) and new weapons. Others are Super Sensors like Sonar, Artificial Intelligence, All-Electric ships, Stealth technology, Composites, Networking, Space Based Services, Nanotech, Laser weapons, Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles.

Two years ago many missile experts in the U.S. Navy believed that the long rumored Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile, the DF-21D, was operational. As far as anyone knows, or will admit, the complete system has not been tested. There are hints that there were some tests three years ago and that all the components of the system were present and working. There are photos of DF-21Ds on TELs (transporter erector launcher vehicles) and announcements of new units activated for the 2nd Artillery Missile Brigade, equipped with DF-21 missiles. In theory, such weapons are possible and for China they are an ideal way of attacking American carriers. It's an expensive way to hit a carrier, since each of these missiles costs over $20 million. But if you have to get it done that's a reasonable price. In the future the price will come down a bit and anti-missile systems available to warships will be better at dealing with them. Guided warheads could also be launched from space satellites. You can see where this is going and there will be a lot more of it this century.

The shift of American focus from South Asia, Afghanistan, Middle East and Iran to Pacific Ocean is clear signal that two giants are all set to collide somewhere in the Pacific and the trigger of conflict is in the center of South China Sea dispute. Being aware of this eventuality long ago, China had started building its Navy and brought it from under the shadow of PLA (Navy) to China Navy and making it the second largest after the US Navy. A pre-requisite to this development was economic growth which China achieved by becoming the second largest economy. The imminent conflict will, therefore, be between the Number One and Number Two. And if this conflict takes place in a period of decade from now, it would between equals.

A report carried by The National Interest, says that as China develops complex economic and strategic interests in Africa and the Middle East, freedom of navigation through the Indian Ocean and much of the Pacific will concern Beijing mightily. But unsurprisingly, there is discomfort with sharing maritime security responsibilities close to home. Considering the relative strength of those patrolling the waters—mainly Japan and the United States—the Chinese fear that in times of crisis, access to critical sea lines of communication could be blocked. Or worse, Beijing might be forced to compromise on its long-held logic of sovereignty over a region that extends far beyond what international law permits.

Before it can dominate the seas, China has much catching up to do. The combined weight of twenty-one of the world’s biggest navies is 6.75 million tons. Remove the United States Navy (USN), and that leaves the global fleet 46 percent lighter at about 3.63 million tons. Though not the most accurate gauge of naval prowess, the skewered weight distribution—combined with the USN’s pound-for-pound superiority—cannot bode well for a rising power wary of the status quo. Unfortunately, what China has to show for three decades of naval modernization are a handful of nuclear-powered attack- and ballistic-missile submarines that lag behind those of the world’s premier navies, an aircraft carrier they’re only beginning to learn how to use and anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM). Only the ASBM really gives Beijing an edge over the competition.

The Pentagon reports the highly maneuverable missile has a range of one thousand miles. Considering even the next generation of naval fighter aircraft will lack the range to return to their carriers if launched further than six hundred miles from their intended target, denying potential adversaries’ access to a significant portion of the Western Pacific looks possible. But for the near future, blue-water ambitions are likely to remain unfulfilled. A refurbished Soviet-era aircraft carrier, ASBMs and a few unstealthy nuclear submarines won’t allow the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to conduct complex operations far from its shores, even if China’s sailors can master their new boats.

Given the bulk of what the PLAN presently fields, the implications are likely to be felt closer to home. The large fleet of Song, Ming and Romeo class diesel-electric submarines, catamarans, Landing Platform Docks, and other short-range and shore-based weapons will influence the day-to-day choices nearby countries will make—especially whether to align more closely with China or the United States. China is eager to see its maritime neighbors embrace its naval-modernization effort. Such support is now vital after the apparent loss of Burma as an alternative energy corridor, which has led some in Beijing to question the prudence of banking on vastly expensive and highly tenuous relationships to secure resources.

Whatever China is deliberating is not very clear but it is understood that China is well aware of high cost of miscalculation. China should understand that a stronger navy should allow Beijing to throw its weight around with greater ease. But if Chinese naval modernization is spurring others in the region to do the same—and if some of its more powerful neighbors look more than capable of playing catch-up—it is difficult to decipher what advantage the PLAN hopes to wield in the long term. Hegemony in the Pacific and Indian Oceans seems unlikely. Anything less could leave Beijing more isolated and vulnerable in a powerful, distrustful backyard.

The U.S. Navy is rethinking how it will use its submarines in a future Pacific War. According to Strategy Page, a campaign against Chinese shipping is unlikely, in part because of what actually happened during the last great anti-shipping campaign, which occurred during World War II (1939-45). After the war, the U.S. analyzed its operations against Japanese shipping and found that submarines were important, but not the only weapon effective against shipping. Some 8.9 million tons of Japanese shipping was sunk or so seriously damaged (disabled) at the end of the war. Submarines accounted for 54.7 percent of this. But 16.3 percent was attributable to carrier-based aircraft, 14.5 percent to land- based planes and 9.3 percent to mines (most dropped by B-29s). Less than one percent was due to surface gunfire, and the balance of 4 percent was caused by accidents. Because of their ability to operate in enemy-controlled (mainly by land-based aircraft) waters, submarines accounted for about 60 percent of the damage until the final months of the war. Then, during late 1944, carrier task forces went deep into enemy controlled areas, defending themselves against land-based warplanes and sinking a large numbers of ships. After April, 1945 Japanese shipping was restricted to the Korean and Manchurian runs and to shallow coastal waters. At this point the naval mines dropped by B-29s in Japanese harbors and inland waterways accounted for 50 percent of all ships sunk or damaged. That was then, but sixty years later the United States is able to monitor large ocean areas and has aircraft that are able to hit anything that's spotted.  

The report says that the U.S. has adopted a new approach to any potential war with China. The U.S. Department of Defense has been told that, for the foreseeable future, there will be no more large-scale land campaigns. The air force, navy, and marines responded with a plan (AirSea Battle) that has been in the work for years. The new strategy is designed to cope with the rising power of China in the Pacific. AirSea Battle involves tighter planning and coordination of navy, marine, and navy forces, plus the development of some new weapons and tactics and cooperation with allies.

AirSea Battle has been widely accepted, as China continues to make all its neighbors nervous. That's because the Chinese name for China translates as "middle kingdom" as in "China is the middle of the world." The Chinese government, a communist dictatorship by any other name, is using nationalism to keep its pro-democracy opposition off balance. China has border disputes, expressed or implied, with all its neighbors. This has made the neighbors uneasy, especially as Chinese military forces have been modernized and more aggressive over the last decade. While Air-Sea Battle was developed to keep the United States out of extensive land combat (the navy still has commandos and marines for brief operations ashore), those kinds of wars tend to show up when you least expect, want, or are prepared for them. For the moment, U.S. military planners believe they can avoid a large land war.

The U.S. Navy has been studying (and war-gaming) the situation and that included an examination of American submarine use since World War II. After the 1960s, the U.S. shifted to using only nuclear propelled submarines. During the Cold War (1948-91), American subs were meant for use in defeating the growing Soviet (Russian) fleet. That force disappeared in the 1990s. At that point the Chinese fleet got larger and modernized, but is still nowhere near the size of the Soviet Navy. But this time the U.S. was facing a major trading nation. Unlike Russia, which was largely self-sufficient (or could get what it needed overland from neighbors), China requires thousands of ships a year to handle exports and imports. Like Japan during World War II, China is vulnerable here. Discounting the significance of economy in the conduct of war is always a very costly miscalculation. AirSea battle concentrates on military operations. But these will be heavily influenced by economic factors. With the U.S. is now dependent on other nations like much of the rest of the world, China included, the U.S. and many other Chinese trading partners would suffer severe economic disruptions if there were a maritime blockade of China. This could trigger the risk of nuclear war.

The Chinese Navy is the second largest naval service in the world, only behind the United States Navy. With a personnel strength of over 250,000, the PLAN also includes the 35,000-strong Coastal Defense Force and the 56,000-strong PLA Marine Corps, plus a 56,000-strong PLA Naval Air Force, operating several hundred land-based aircraft and ship-based helicopters. As part of its overall program of naval modernization, the PLA Navy is moving towards the development of a blue-water navy. There is a significant strategic rethinking and the new strategic threats include possible conflict with the United States and/or a resurgent Japan in areas such as the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. At the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the PLAN, 52 vessels were shown in maneuvers off Qingdao in April 2009 including previously unseen nuclear submarines. The demonstration was seen as a sign of the growing status of China, while the CMC Chairman, Hu Jintao, indicated that China is neither seeking regional hegemony nor entering an arms race. Adm. Robert F. Willard, head of the U.S. Pacific Command, called the PLAN's modernization "aggressive," and that it raised concerns in the region. Japan has also raised concerns about the PLAN's growing capability and the lack of transparency as its naval strength keeps on expanding. China has entered into service the world's first anti-ship ballistic missile called DF-21D. The potential threat from the DF-21D against U.S. aircraft carriers has reportedly caused major changes in U.S. strategy. The PLAN's ambitions reportedly include operating out to the first and second island chains as far as the South Pacific near Australia, and spanning to the Aleutian islands, and operations extending to the Straits of Malacca near the Indian Ocean.

The future Chines fleet will be composed of a balance of assets aimed at maximizing the  fighting effectiveness. On the high end, there would be modern destroyers equipped with long range air defense missiles (Type 052B, Type 052C, Type 051C); destroyers armed with supersonic anti-ship missiles (Sovremenny class); advanced nuclear powered attack and ballistic missile submarines (Type 093, Type 094); advanced conventional attack submarines (Kilo and Yuan); aircraft carriers and large amphibious warfare vessels capable mobilizing troops at long distances. On the medium and low end, there would be more economical multi-role capable frigates and destroyers (upgraded Luda, Luhu, Jiangwei II, Jiangkai); fast littoral missile attack craft (Houjian, Houxin, Houbei); various landing ships and light craft; and conventionally powered coastal patrol submarines.

Ronald O'Rourke of the Congressional Research Service reported that the long term goals of PLAN planning include: assert or defend China’s claims in maritime territorial disputes and China’s interpretation of international laws relating to freedom of navigation in exclusive economic zones (an interpretation at odds with the U.S. interpretation); protect China’s sea lines of communications to the Persian Gulf, on which China relies for some of its energy imports; and assert China’s status as a major world power, encourage other states in the region to align their policies with China, and displace U.S. regional military influence.

The developments are interesting and clearly explain the shift of focus in US global ambitions. It also explains how and why US is warming up to its Cold-war adversary, India and why is it in a hurry to offload its Afghanistan baggage. It, in part, should also explain US’s dumping of its Cold-war ally; Pakistan. It sometimes becomes clear why the Chinese Muslim province is perpetually at war with tracks of unrest leading to Pakistan’s restive regions where TTP is fighting Pakistan at the behest of India and the US. There are indeed no long-term foes and friends in realist politics.

Anti-US alliance of the Cold War: What else is common between India and Afghanistan?

If history is any guide, India has an extra-ordinary preference for puppet governments in Afghanistan. Both India and Afghanistan were active allies of USSR against the US during the Cold War. Now when the reins of power are again in the hands of another unpopular and foreign-supported regime in Kabul, India is active again to gain some sort of foothold in Kabul. In fact, both India and Pakistan are trying to outsmart each other for a major chunk of influence in post-US Afghanistan. Pakistan has a national security objective in having a decisive say in Kabul; Afghanistan is its immediate neighbor, its backyard. India is trying to overtake Pakistan for Kabul race precisely for the same reason; Afghanistan is Pakistan’s immediate neighbor. India has its strategic interests in Kabul because while in Kabul, it can encircle Pakistan and imperil its Western borders in order to keep it in line and establish its hegemony in the region. It has already opened a number of border posts, called consulates, along Pak-Afghanistan border which are busy pumping money to intensify Pakistan insurgency and label Pakistan as sponsor of Afghanistan unrest.

India has a bigger dream to realize through its presence in Kabul. It wants to keep China at leash by keeping it away from this confluence of cross-roads leading to Central Asia. It has made heavy investments in building infrastructure in this war-ravaged country.  On this point, the US and India have converging interests. If the US, therefore, has to make a choice between India and Pakistan for a suitable heir to Kabul throne, it would more probably pick India.

The realist politics are driven by nothing but the selfish national interests and thus, have very interesting political dynamics. India was an anti-US ally of Soviet Russia in the Cold War era. It was a bitter critic of the US supporting Afghanistan insurgency when Communist forces occupied Afghanistan. The then government of Afghanistan, largely unpopular, was in Soviet camp. India and the then-Afghanistan were allies. It is for this reason that in that popular revolt against Soviet Russia, India was opposed to the Mujahideen who were funded and equipped by the CIA.

Look at the irony of history. Pakistan was a committed US ally in the war against Soviet Russia. Without Pakistan’s support, Mujahideen could not drive Russian forces leading to disintegration of Soviet Union, a goal the US wanted to achieve at all costs. Pakistan has always remained on the right side of the US during the cold war and paid dearly for that. With the changing scenario, it now finds itself in the woods after having earned American fury despite fighting US “war on terror” for 10 years. The loss of human lives alone of Pakistanis, branded as collateral damage, is 4000 military men and 35000 civilians. Such are the ways of international politics. India, despite having remained aloof, and largely unhurt, in the war or terror, is now preparing to take the reins of power after the endgame in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan’s present government is a replica of the pro-Russia regime of 1970s and 1980s; unpopular, unrepresentative and supported by the occupation armies. For these reasons, it needed the political support of USSR and India then and of the US and India now. The best way to sustain this support is to accuse Pakistan for anything and everything happening in the country.

It will be very interesting to look at the Indian interests in Afghanistan as perceived by Indian analysts. According to an article in Foreign Policy, India is a significant player in Afghanistan. It has the world's fifth-largest aid program there, having committed $1.5 billion in developmental assistance. It has played a key role in reconstruction and has developed training programs for Afghan civil servants and police. India has made these investments in the country because its policymakers are keen on ensuring that a radical Islamist regime does not return to the country, that Pakistan not wields a disproportionate influence on any future government, and that Afghanistan might serve as a bridgehead for India's economic ties to the Central Asian states.

India can do anything to ensure that a representative government does not return to Afghanistan, if it gives some space to Pakistan to wield some interest in Afghanistan.  According to the article, India fears that a reconstituted Taliban regime would allow a host of anti-Indian terrorist groups, most notably Lashkar-e-Taiba, to find sanctuaries and training grounds in Afghanistan. Some astute New Delhi-based analysts also worry that a resurgent Taliban may actually help broker a peace agreement between the Pakistani regime and Pakistani domestic terrorist groups like Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. That, they argue, could redirect the collective wrath of various jihadi organizations from internecine conflict and focus it on India, and more specifically Indian-controlled Kashmir. Finally, they are concerned that a Taliban-dominated regime would forge links with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and other jihadi groups in Central Asia, thereby adversely affecting India's quest for access to energy resources and markets in the region. Yet New Delhi also sees the writing on the wall but it will not easily walk away from Afghanistan.

India is counting on its historic ties to the Northern Alliance, which is a representative body of Afghanistan’s ethnic minorities and which India opposed in Afghanistan Jihad of 1980s.

According to TIME, with the U.S. looking for an exit, India is trying to figure out what its role in Afghanistan's uncertain future will be. U.S. counterinsurgency strategy aims to "clear, hold, build and transfer" a stable Afghanistan back to its people. The Indian government hopes to aid the "build and transfer" part of that effort by helping to develop Afghanistan's infrastructure and institutions.

Whatever New Delhi does, it can expect truculent opposition from archrival Pakistan, which has long tried to influence what happens in Afghanistan, primarily to ensure that the country's power players are friendly to Islamabad. Its suspicion of India's regional intentions is plainly revealed in several cables released by WikiLeaks. Pakistan's press routinely accuses India of sending in spies in the guise of doctors and engineers, and Islamabad claims that India's four consulates are bases for espionage and for funneling aid to separatist rebels in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan. Pervez Musharraf, a former Pakistani President, is convinced New Delhi is responsible for providing insurgents with weapons. "The Afghans have nothing," he told Time, "so it must be the Indians."

While discussing India’s Stake in Afghanistan, The Journal of International Security Affairs writes in post 9/11 Afghanistan, India’s interests have centered on three broad objectives: security concerns, economic interests and regional aspirations. India has revived its historical, traditional, socio-cultural and civilizational linkages with the objective of a long-term stabilization of Afghanistan. As part of this effort, India has supported the nascent democratic regime, seeing in it the best hope for preventing the return of the Taliban. India is also looking beyond Afghanistan’s borders, working to revive Afghanistan’s role as a “land bridge” connecting South Asia with Central Asia and providing access to strategic energy resources. Along these lines, India has actively promoted greater trade and economic integration of Afghanistan with South Asia through the regional mechanism of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

With the establishment of an interim government in Afghanistan under President Hamid Karzai in 2001, India announced that it would provide $100 million in reconstruction aid to Afghanistan. Since then, India has followed a policy of high-level engagement—characterized by a range of political, humanitarian, cultural, economic and infrastructure projects. India today ranks overall as Afghanistan’s sixth-largest bilateral donor country, having invested heavily in a range of key sectors of the Afghan economy and pledged to do so to the tune of $1.3 billion more in the years ahead.

There is indeed a critical security concern to India’s involvement in Afghanistan, however—specifically, the possibility of terror emanating from the extremely volatile Pakistan-Afghanistan border and spilling over into India. A strong, stable and democratic Afghanistan would reduce the dangers of extremist violence and terrorism destabilizing the region. Since 9/11, New Delhi’s policy has broadly been in congruence with the U.S. objectives of decimating the Taliban and al-Qaeda and instituting a democratic regime in Kabul.

Today, however, a resurgent Taliban and mounting instability have worsened the outlook for Afghanistan. In the coming days, India’s “aid only” policy is bound to face new challenges—and adapt to them. While Delhi resists putting “boots on ground,” it will need to widen its web of engagement in the rapidly-shrinking political space in Afghanistan. India must revive its traditional Pushtun linkages and at the same time re-engage other ethnic groups as it attempts to strike a balance between continuing support for the Karzai government and increasing its engagement with other factions. By doing so, India will position itself to influence Afghanistan’s evolving political sphere, and serve as a serious interlocutor in the intra-Afghan and inter-regional reconciliation process now underway.

India has no cultural ties with Afghanistan as being claimed by the Indian analysts. Afghanistan, a country of Muslims has ethnic ties and cultural similarities with its immediate neighbors. India is trying hard to ensure continuation of minority-dominated puppet government in Kabul, like it did in 1970s and 1980s, as any popular government chosen by majority Pashtuns will not let India achieve a foothold with the sole objective of using Afghanistan as bridge for its strategic objectives, regional ambitions and its access to resource-rich Central Asia.

Haqqani Network, Pakistan connection and shattered dreams of Afghanistan peace…..

Those who had any illusion of peace in NATO-occupied Afghanistan are in for a big disappointment. Successful attacks in Kabul in the last nine months are a sufficient testimony to the fact that NATO forces are losing ground in Afghanistan. Along the ground, they are losing patience and sanity. The latest turban-bomb attack to kill Afghanistan’s anti-Taliban peace ambassador shows that as long as Karzai and company (read: Uncle Sam) holds the reins of power in Kabul, peace can never return to this hapless country. The assassination of the representative of non-Pashtun minority but a key Afghan political figure Burhanuddin Rabbani, head of the commission meant to negotiate with the Taliban, the High Peace Council (HPC), signals the massive challenges ahead in efforts to end the war. This indicates one thing in clear terms; the peace initiative to be successful has to come from the ethnic majority in Afghanistan.

As expected, the blame for this murder has been laid at the doorstep of Haqqani Network. And to justify NATO forces’ inability to maintain order in Afghanistan, the Network is being shown as a Pakistan-supported formidable force. Before analyzing the situation and drawing conclusion if the Network indeed has its home-base in Pakistan, let us look at the timeline of recent attacks in Afghanistan:

Sept 20 - A Taliban representative meeting with Rabbani, the head of Afghanistan's High Peace Council, detonates a bomb hidden under a turban and kills him at his Kabul home.

Sept 13 - Insurgents holed up on five different floors of a partially constructed building shower Kabul's diplomatic enclave with rocket-propelled grenades and gunfire for 20 hours, while three suicide bombers -- one prevented -- strike police compounds elsewhere in the city. Five Afghan police and 11 civilians, including children, are killed. The U.S. blamed the attack, the most coordinated militant assault on Kabul since the war began in 2001 on the Taliban-linked Haqqani network based on Pakistan's northwest border with Afghanistan.

Aug 19 - Taliban attackers lay siege to a British cultural centre, killing at least nine people during an hours-long assault on the 92nd anniversary of Afghanistan's independence from British rule. A suicide bomber in car blew himself up in front of the gate of the British Council before dawn, and another car packed with explosives detonated moments later while four attackers, three of them men clad in burqa cloak worn by Afghan women, stormed the compound.

June 28 - At least 10 Afghan civilians are killed when suicide bombers and heavily armed Taliban insurgents attacked the Intercontinental hotel, Afghan officials said.

May 21 - A suicide bomber kills six people and wounds 23 when he strikes the cafeteria of a military hospital in a heavily guarded area.

Jan 28 - A suicide attack on a supermarket in the embassy district kills at least nine people, including a prominent Afghan doctor, his rights activist wife and four of their children.

The series of attacks deep inside Kabul speaks clearly that it was more for failure of NATO forces than anything else that the attacks were successfully planned and executed. Pakistan could be a convenient scapegoat but realistic view of the events would reveal that the accusations are only meant to cover the ineffective intelligence network and inefficient response system. This also indicates that majority of Afghan citizens have sympathies with the attackers which totally blinded the intelligence assets of Afghanistan and NATO. Daily Express Tribune, in an article titled, America’s SPECTRE syndrome in Afghanistan has very brilliantly analyzed why Pakistan has nothing to do with these attacks and why North Waziristan Agency cannot be home-base for the attackers. According to this analysis, the Afghanistan problem is not just about the Haqqani Network. Afghanistan has multiple problems, most of which have nothing whatsoever to do with the Haqqanis. Even if the Haqqani Network were entirely taken out, Afghanistan would remain largely the same. In fact, if the only stumbling block between an Afghanistan gone bad and an idyllic Afghanistan were the Network, Afghanistan would have been a piece of cake, not the wicked problem it has become.

According to the article, the attacks clearly show that the line of communication of the insurgents cannot stretch back to North Waziristan. All these attacks have happened deep inside the Afghan territory and indicate the steady loss of control of territory by the Afghan government and the foreign troops. If, for the sake of the argument it is conceded that the Taliban line of communication does extend back to North Waziristan, then the ability of the fighters to go deep in and mount attacks makes an utter mockery of the military and intelligence capabilities of the US and its allies despite the tremendous resources at their disposal.

Is this network operating to further the aims of al Qaeda? The evidence suggests that it has nothing to do with this outfit as it does not target Pakistan, its citizens and its security apparatus. It has confined its operations in Afghanistan and against the occupation forces. A recent interview of Siraj Haqqani with Reuters suggest that they rejected previous attempts at talks by the US and the Afghan government because those overtures were aimed at “creating divisions” among the Taliban. It is therefore misleading to suggest that the Haqqanis operate outside the overall strategic objectives of the Taliban.

Mullah Omar’s Eid-ul-Fitr message, more reconciliatory than the one delivered previous year, speaks about some change in their stance. This message deals with three basic points: the Afghanistan-specific focus of the Taliban; their readiness to negotiate meaningfully, and a warning to the neighbors to desist from interfering in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. Another important motif running through that message was Taliban’s inclusive approach to governance. This also shows that Taliban have come to accept that they cannot rule Afghanistan to the exclusion of other entities.

But the world has to make a clear distinction between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP and its affiliates.

In view of the fact that Haqqani Network may not be the sole reason of humiliating defeat of the mightiest armies, it is beyond comprehension that USA is pressuring Pakistan into launching an attack on the so-called sanctuaries of the Network in NWA. This is particularly disturbing in view of the circumstantial evidence (ability of the Network to operate deep into Afghan capital) that the sanctuaries may have been relocated to somewhere in Afghanistan. Is this pressure a sincere effort to salvage Afghanistan situation for the US? For the sake of argument, if we concede that the Network is indeed hiding in NWA and Pakistan Army’s operation will weaken their ability to attack US interests in Afghanistan, will this give some sort of face saving to the retreating NATO forces? What should be the priority of Pakistan’s security establishment? To attack and eliminate the elements of TTP and al Qaeda attacking Pakistan or further thin out its resources to fight those who are a threat to NATO forces? This is where interests of Pakistan and USA do not converge and they will have to find a middle ground to come to an understanding. The circumstances point to the fact that the problem exists within Afghanistan and should be sorted out by NATO and Afghan National Army.

The only way-forward to peace in Afghanistan is purely home-grown initiative keeping in view the demographic realities. Any proposal based on any other consideration will complicate the matters further and push Afghanistan into a never-ending chaos and anarchy.

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