NATO supply routes: Our national interests are as sacred as yours….

In order to avert the risk of its international isolation, Pakistan has agreed to reopen the ground lanes of communication (GLOC), critically vital to the logistic support of NATO forces fighting in Afghanistan. These forces are apparently engaged in war on terror but the menace of terrorism has been strengthened many times over since October 2001 when the US decided to attack Afghanistan to dislodge the Taliban regime which was accused of providing sanctuaries to al-Qaeda. It has now been established through hindsight that it was al-Qaeda which attacked the US on 9/11 in order to pull the sole super power into Afghanistan, a graveyard of many Empires. 

The US and its allies have lost the war as they have failed to achieve the stated objective of bringing peace in Afghanistan. The US misadventure in Afghanistan has not only threatened the peace and security of countries in this region including Afghanistan, Central Asian states, China, Pakistan and India but it has also endangered the security of US and its allies. Al-Qaeda is now a formidable force operating from many bases around the globe. The US dream of defeating al-Qaeda has been totally frustrated. The West has lost in Afghanistan like the British. Its bruised ego demands that it should leave like a victor to justify hundreds of billions of taxpayers’ dollars and, if that is not possible, it should find a scapegoat and pass on the buck. Pakistan was a convenient scapegoat but it proved itself otherwise during a long standoff after the Salala incident. The US had to blink first leading to reopening of GLOC by Pakistan.

The US had applied all the tactics, many of those clearly dirty and blackmailing like raising the issue of Balochistan, in order to pressure Pakistan into submission. This country, which is now subsisting on international hand-outs, successfully held its ground on principles and resisted all sorts of arm-twisting pressure.

Let us look at recent developments and Critical Threats in the run-up to reopening of GLOC.

There was behind the scene consultations. Pakistani’s Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Tom Nides met in Islamabad last week to discuss reopening NATO supply routes into Afghanistan. According to a Foreign Office spokesman, the meeting led to significant progress, though no final decision was reached. At the meeting, the U.S. delegation also assured Pakistan that the U.S. would distribute the first $400 million dollar installment of the Coalition Support Fund (CSF) within a week’s period. Sources said that the technical and monetary issues related to reopening the supply lines have been resolved and though a U.S. apology over the Salala border incident that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers in November may come forth this week, it will most likely not come from “the highest ranks.” Other sources claim that a U.S. team comprised of senior members of the White House National Security staff has brought a draft proposal to Islamabad that “meets Pakistan’s demand for an apology without embarrassing” the Obama administration. Although the U.S. Department of Defense remains opposed to the proposed apology, official sources claim that the U.S. State Department is strongly supporting the proposal to accept Pakistan’s demand for an apology.

Speaking jointly with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey on Saturday, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said that Islamabad and Washington are continuing discussions over reopening the Ground Lines of Communications (GLOCs) and that the two countries should work together to confront a common enemy in the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP). In reference to negotiations over reopening the NATO supply routes, Panetta noted that “there are still some tough issues to resolve.” U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed similar sentiments when she talked to Pakistani Prime Minister via telephone on Sunday, saying that the two countries should work together to defeat “the common enemy.”

A Pentagon budget document called the omnibus reprogramming request sent to U.S. Congress on Friday revealed that continued closure of Pakistan’s NATO supply route is costing the Department of Defense more than $2.1 billion in extra transportation costs. In the document, the Army requested $1.7 billion from Congress for “shortfalls that resulted from increased fuel costs and continued closure of the Pakistan [GLOC]” while the Air Force asked for $369.2 million partially due to the closure of the Pakistan [GLOC].” NATO Secretary General Andres Fogh Rasmussen, on Monday, expressed hope that Pakistan would soon reopen the NATO supply route. Rasmussen emphasized the importance of the NATO-Pakistan relationship in light of the expected drawdown in the military campaign in Afghanistan by 2014.

In the meantime, drone strikes continued to target the terrorists. Some of the militants targeted were foreign fighters belonging to the Turkmenistan Islamic Movement.    

Afghanistan-Pakistan relations continued deteriorating due to Salala-like incidents and anti-Pakistan Taliban strikes against Pakistani border posts. Afghanistan threatened to report Pakistan to the UN Security Council over what Afghan authorities allege was “Pakistani rocket shelling” of the eastern province of Kunar in recent weeks. According to an official speaking to AFP, rockets have displaced thousands of villagers from Kunar as Pakistani security forces retaliate against Taliban militants responsible for cross-border attacks. Foreign Ministry spokesman Faramarz Tamana said Afghanistan “will refer this issue to the United Nations Security Council,” if bilateral talks between President Hamid Karzai and Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf fail to produce any conclusions.

Pakistani officials claim that 60 Afghan soldiers crossed into Pakistan on Monday, sparking clashes in Upper Kurram agency that resulted in the death of two tribesmen and the injury of another, according to a senior official speaking to AFP on the condition of anonymity. Local residents added that Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers pursued attackers fleeing Shehar-e-Nau village in Pakitia province. Spokesman for army corps 203 in southeastern Afghanistan Colonel Ahmad Jan, however, denied the allegations, claiming that ANA forces had “not entered Pakistan.” Pakistan plans to issue a formal protest against Afghanistan in response to the incursion.  

On last Sunday, hundreds of militants reportedly gathered in Afghanistan’s eastern province of Kunar, dozens of whom crossed into Sabir Killey village, in Upper Dir’s Soni Darr area, in an ambush on a Pakistani security forces check post. In the ensuing firefight, six militants were killed. Pakistani intelligence officials stated the militants belonged to Pakistani cleric Mullah Fazlullah’s faction of the Pakistani Taliban. Meanwhile, Taliban commander Mullah Mansoor was killed on Sunday following clashes between militants and security forces in the Dir Bala area of Dir. According to local sources, 34 militants were killed during the three days of fighting in the area.  

In the backdrop of these developments, was Islamabad becoming increasingly desperate to find a way out of this crisis created by closing down of GLOCs? In view of some analysts, it would have been a disaster for Pakistan had the US, which is a big financer, and international monitory institutions like the IMF and the World Bank, refused to bail out its already frail economy." Both countries realized that they were gaining nothing from the deadlock and they had to go forward. Both countries had calmed down by now and they felt they had to get back to business. When the Pakistanis were too angry in November last year, the US had agreed to tender an apology, but the decision was halted on Pakistan's own claim that the parliament was reviewing relations with the US. Observers believe Islamabad's decision to resume NATO supplies will help ease its tensions with the US.

By perpetuating the crisis, Pakistan was risking international isolation and its due role in the future of Afghanistan. It, therefore, had to convince the US that its interests in Afghanistan should not be put at stake for the benefit of India and other regional players. By averting the risk of isolation, Pakistan is still exposed to the risk of backlash from Islamists. These Islamists are necessarily the Taliban of its supporters. It is the traditional ghairat brigade and right-wing political forces. The reopening of NATO supply routes remains an unpopular decision in Pakistan. The government faced immense political pressure from opposition parties, including hard-line Islamist groups. Observers say that despite the fact that the resumption of supplies will improve US-Pakistani relations; the PPP government is going to face a severe backlash from the Islamist parties. Pakistani militants opposed to the resumption of supplies - which includes the Taliban - have warned they will carry out attacks on NATO supply trucks.

But resumption of supply routes without a formal apology indicates Islamabad’s desperation to end the crisis. In a carefully worded statement, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said she was sorry for the deaths of 24 Pakistani soldiers in a NATO airstrike on the Afghan border last November. She slipped in an apology too on Pakistan’s behalf saying that, “We are both sorry for losses suffered by both our countries in this fight against terrorists.” And she announced that NATO supply routes, closed since last November, would be reopened.

As it stands, at best the two countries have agreed a truce which opens the political space for them to work together to try to end the war in Afghanistan. According to Reuters,  it is a missed opportunity for the United States to redefine its relationship with Pakistan, returning instead to a toxic mutual dependency which allows both countries to blame the other for their failings. How close they manage to steer to either the former or latter outcome – and the real risk is that they continue to muddle along in the middle – will become clear only when the full details of their negotiations emerge. But there are some fairly obvious signs to watch for. There is increased anti-Americanism fuelled by right-wing forces, the Haqqani factor and continued drone strikes. Pakistan has to safeguard its own national security interests.

Underneath what Washington sees as near-suicidal reluctance by the  Pakistani military to turn against Islamist insurgents lies legitimate security interests. The colonial-era Durand Line which marks the border with Afghanistan has never been recognized by Kabul, leaving Pakistan vulnerable to the idea of a revived Pashtunistan incorporating the Pashtun people of southern Afghanistan and those living on the Pakistani side as far as the Indus river. Pakistan and Afghanistan are never going to have settled relations until that border issue is addressed in some way (tensions on the border have been flaring up again, aggravated by accusations from both Afghanistan and Pakistan of militant sanctuaries on either side.) Will the United States be willing to nudge the Afghans into talks that, while unlikely to reach a settlement for years (Afghanistan is fiercely opposed to recognizing the Durand Line as the border) would at least indicate a readiness to address one of the root causes of conflict? 

To enhance Pakistan’s skepticism, Washington has actively welcomed Indian participation in developing Afghanistan; Pakistan opposes any Indian military involvement and only reluctantly has accepted economic support. Have red lines on Indian involvement in Afghanistan been agreed between the United States, Pakistan and India? Apparently, there is no such agreement. If its past record is any evidence of its future dealings with Pakistan, Pakistanis have no reason to rely on the US. If the United States has achieved the feat of being disliked by almost all sections of Pakistani society, it is partly because its past policies proved so damaging to Pakistan, particularly its support for India. Its approach to Pakistan has been one of using it for its own strategic ends whether these be challenging the Soviet Union during the Cold War or fighting the war in Afghanistan. That has been changing slowly – over the last few years Washington has begun to acknowledge its real challenge was in stabilizing not Afghanistan but Pakistan. With that has come tentative support for democracy – a country being used purely for U.S. foreign policy ends is “more conveniently” run by a general; a country in need of internal stabilization is more likely to be balanced through democracy.  How far will Washington continue to support Pakistan’s chaotic nascent democracy, or alternatively how far will it fall back on the old habits of military-to-military cooperation?

The lessons learnt from the seven-month long stand-off are very clear. The major lesson is that it is not possible even for a super power, to browbeat Pakistan notwithstanding its fragile economy, tainted leadership, political and ethnic polarization and fragmented social order. Pakistan has a strong judiciary and a well-motivated defense machine and these institutions are a sufficient pre-requisite for country’s survival. Pakistan has conducted itself in a most responsible manner and played its role in the efforts to bring peace in the region. Despite all the dirty tactics employed by the US, including attacks on Pakistani border posts from Afghanistan, Pakistan did not disappoint the world community. 

Israel’s possible strike on Iran will only strengthen the Mullah regime….

Hussain Saqib

US, Israel and their allies are arm-twisting and pressurizing Iran into submission over its nuclear program. The rest of the world, including the so-called Ummah, is either watching Iran’s persistent defiance of global pressure helplessly or with wide-eyes, except those nations of the region who foresee devastating consequences of any misadventure in Iran. Iran feels that its nuclear program is directly threatened by the USA, Israel and conservative Arab nations for various reasons. 

The United States and its traditional allies (Britain, France, Germany, etc.) are increasingly worried about a nuclear Iran, especially given the tense relationship Iran has with most Western nations since the Iranian Revolution of the late 1970s. Israel has a long history of conflict with the Muslim world, and the current president of Iran has made several anti-Semitic comments, and has indicated that he does not believe Israel should exist. Israelis are worried that Iran's President is seeking to acquire nuclear weapons in order to destroy Israel and kill millions of Jews.

Conservative Arab nations, such as Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States are equally wary of Iran’s nuclear. Having a total lack of ability to target Iran’s nuclear installations themselves, these Arab nations may very well aid and abet any attack by the West and/or Israel. Historically Persian Iran has been in conflict with the Arab nations. This is partly due to the fact that Iran is dominated by the Shiite sect of Islam, while most Arab nations are controlled by the majority Sunni sect of Islam.

Although, there is still no hard proof that Iran’s nuclear program is designed to produce nuclear arms, the US and its allies would like to forestall any future eventuality leading Iran to becoming a nuclear state. Still, Israel’s right-wing Likud Party may actually intend to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, just as Israel attacked Iraqi and Syrian nuclear facilities to preserve its Mideast nuclear monopoly. Whipping up a crisis over Iran also serves to deflect attention from the unresolved question of Palestine and from Israel’s growing social and economic problems.

Having assessed the cost, and possibly learned from Iraq fiasco, the US & Co is exercising maximum restraint in going to a war on the issue. The war, if it happens, will have the potential for a wide-spread conflict engulfing in the war-flames the farther shores. Apart from destabilization, destruction and devastation for the region, will any attack by Israel or the US have any devastating consequences for the attackers themselves?

According to a recent analysis carried by The National Interest, Israel has some three hundred nuclear devices in its arsenal, capable of being delivered by medium-range ballistic missiles, submarine-launched cruise missiles and aircraft with standoff missiles. Two of Israel’s three German-supplied “Dolphin-class” submarines carrying nuclear-armed missiles are reportedly stationed off Iran’s coast, providing an invulnerable second-strike capability for the Jewish state. Any Iranian nuclear attack on Israel would result in Iran being vaporized. Israel’s potential target list in Iran is clear. At least twelve major nuclear or nuclear-related sites would have to be struck to seriously damage Iran’s nuclear program, some of which is buried deep underground. Leading targets include the aboveground heavy-water/reactor facility at Arak; reactors at Bushehr (a civilian power reactor relying on Russian-supplied fuel), the new underground enrichment facility near Qum at Fordow, the ore conversion plants near Isfahan, and other facilities at Qazvin, Damghan, Tabriz, Lavizan, Chalus, Darkhovin and Parchin.

Iran itself and the adjoining states may become a direct target of nuclear fallout because destroying Iran’s many reactors and processing facilities could release large amounts of radiation and create radioactive dust storms. Winds would carry this toxic miasma over Afghanistan and its large U.S. military garrison. Dangerous radiation would also extend to Pakistan, western India, Iraq, Kuwait and to the Gulf, where large numbers of U.S. military personnel are based. Equally ominous, radioactive dust could blanket oil fields in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. High-altitude winds would spread radioactivity around the globe, as occurred at Chernobyl in the Ukraine, but at a factor of twenty times or more.

Air attacks may not be as effective as a nuclear attack.  The Pentagon has estimated it will need to strike at least 3,200 targets in Iran, including nuclear facilities, air and naval bases, military production plants, headquarters, communications hubs, missile bases, Gulf ports, and command-and-control facilities. After the first wave, air and missile strikes as well as Special Forces raids would have to continue for weeks, perhaps months. However, the most important result of an Israeli air campaign against Iran would be to draw the United States into a long-running conflict with the Islamic Republic that it neither wants nor can afford. After having lost two expensive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is quite inconceivable that the US would decide to go to a third major conflict which could possibly wreck America’s finances and plunge the republic in an Orwellian state of permanent war.

It may be kept in view that the national interests of Israel and the United States do not converge, and many leading figures of the US administration blindly believe the Israeli claims that Iran poses a deadly threat to its existence, and act as if the Israeli nuclear arsenal is of no concern. 

Paul Rogers in his report, Military Action Against Iran: Impact and Effects, warns that consequences of Iran conflict would be devastating and would lead to a long war. The study follows Israeli reports that Syria is manufacturing Iranian M-600 missiles for Hezbollah, the Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu calling Iran “the ultimate terrorist threat” and saying it was a mistake to think Iran’s nuclear ambitions could be contained, and a call from the United Arab Emirates Ambassador in Washington for a military strike on Iran.

The report outlines the likely shape of an Israeli strike, saying it would be focused not only on destroying ‘military real estate’ – nuclear and missile targets - but also would hit factories and research centers, and even university laboratories, in order to do as much damage as possible to the Iranian expertise that underpins the program. The strike would not be limited to remote bases but would involve the direct bombing of targets in Tehran. It would probably include attempts to kill those technocrats who manage Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. It would be widely viewed across the Middle East as having been undertaken with the knowledge, approval and assistance of the United States, even if carried out solely by Israel.

Professor Rogers says that, “There would be many civilian casualties, both directly among people working on Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, but also their families as their living quarters were hit, and secretaries, cleaners, laborers and other staff in factories, research stations and university departments.”While much damage would be done to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, it would increase Iranian political unity, making the Ahmadinejad regime more stable.

Iran would be able to respond in many ways, argues the report, including withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and immediate action to develop nuclear weapons to deter further attacks. Such work would use deeply-buried facilities that are reported to be under construction. A series of actions aimed at Israel as well as targeting the United States and its western partners including missile attacks on Israel. These actions, including paramilitary and/or missile attacks on western Gulf oil production, processing and transportation facilities would cause a sharp rise in oil prices by closing the Straits of Hormuz.

The experts and analysts agree that an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities would almost certainly be the beginning of a long-term process of regular Israeli air strikes to further prevent the development of nuclear weapons and medium-range missiles. Iranian responses would also be long-term, ushering in a lengthy war with global as well as regional implications. The report concludes that “the consequences of a military attack on Iran are so serious that they should not be encouraged in any shape or form. However difficult, other ways must be found to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis.”

US 5th Fleet faces the Sunburn in the Strait of Hormuz....

In spite of rhetoric of the Mullah regime, Iran’s nuclear capability cannot be an existential threat for Israel. It, however, is a real challenge to superiority of Israel being the only nuclear power in Middle East. Israel can hardly digest the prospect of having lost the nuclear card at the hands of Iranian Mullahs. It wants to destroy Iran’s nuclear installations in a surprise attack, have US Navy sink the whole of Iranian Navy in the Gulf and rally around the civilized world for economic sanctions to cripple and paralyze Iran’s economy.

The air attack has yet to materialize, the sanctions have started taking their toll on the ordinary lives of Iranian citizens but Iran’s resolve to go ahead with its nuclear program has not been broken. Iran is daring the US to come and fight in the Gulf and its war games in the Strait of Hormuz named as Velayat, are being perceived by independent analysts as potential threat to oil supply in case Iran is pushed to the wall.

The current stand-off between the US-led countries and stand-alone, soon-to-be nuclear-armed state of Iran has occupied the attention of those who are keenly watching the developments taking place in the region. Some are even betting on a surprise Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear installations and are predicting a catastrophe of unimagined proportions. Iran’s persistent resistance suggests that Iran finds itself really capable to close the Strait of Hormuz for long and even creating a world of hurt for the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet. Iran is generally relying on a build-up of anti-ship weapons called Sunburn missiles, which it has procured from Russia and China over the last decade. These are top-notch weapons developed by the Russians as a low-cost challenge to the expensive, tech-heavy weaponry of the U.S., and specifically the aircraft carrier task force. A conflict is going to be a huge test of a global-naval doctrine that Russia and China will watch with tremendous interest. Iran's mix of anti-ship missiles (Sunburns, Onyxs, home produced, etc) is unknown, but it is armed to the teeth with thousands of such weapons in its possession.

Should the US Navy take the risk of any misadventure in the Strait? According to an analyst, the US Navy is professional, but the Strait doesn’t allow for the normal defense in depth available in open seas, in fact it offers the Iranians a cross fire setup or triangulation. If you read discussions on various military sites, there is a lively debate on American ship defense system like the Aegis. However, almost nobody claims this to be fully protective against ship strikes. And an oil tanker, no way.  It is important that the US is working on new generation laser defense to counter these missiles; however they are still in development. This puts added pressure for Iran to have this fight now, not later.

The Sunburn is perhaps the most lethal anti-ship missile in the world, designed to fly as low as 9 feet above ground/water at more than 1,500 miles per hour with a disturbing range.  The missile uses a violent pop-up maneuver for its terminal approach to throw off Phalanx and other U.S. anti-missile defense systems. Given their low cost, they’re perfectly suited for close quarter naval conflict in the bathtub-like Persian Gulf. Additionally, Iran must have plotted and mapped every firing angle and location along the Gulf, their home-court coastline. Iran’s home court strategic advantage and weaponry may mean nasty losses for the 5th Fleet. If they leave, the Iranians would use naval mines to close the strait and missiles to hamper the mine clearing operations.

There are varying opinions on this account too. According to an article in National Interest, if Tehran crosses the Obama administration’s "red lines"—developing a nuclear weapon or blocking world oil supplies transiting the Strait of Hormuz—Washington will face a dilemma. The risks of using force are high, yet the risk of inaction may also be unacceptable. If red lines are crossed the United States must respond, but it should ponder options other than bombing. One such option worthy of consideration: using mines around Iran's naval ports and oil-export terminals. This might create better leverage than a campaign of air strikes—without generating the death and destruction that could give Iran a cause for perpetual grievance. Mining would shut in both the Iranian navy and Iran's oil exports.

Modern U.S. naval mines are not indiscriminate weapons. They have programmable sensor-trigger mechanisms. These mines can be set to arm after a delay for a warning period, select targets based on a ship’s magnetic, pressure and acoustic signature, and they can be neutralized or cleared after a conflict. Naval mines have advantages over air strikes. Even precision-guided weapons might well cause civilian casualties and collateral damage that cannot be undone. Air attacks against inland targets would put American pilots at substantial risk. An air campaign could not assure the complete destruction of underground targets.

Worse, mere air strikes might not provide a successful exit strategy. An exit from conflict must be based on forcing (and also enticing) Tehran to accept a political settlement ending its threatening behavior. Yet in addition to its inherent risks, a bombing campaign might cause the Iranian people to rally in support of the unpopular regime. This could further embolden Iran's leaders.

Proponents of this option believe that it could degrade Iran's ability to shut down the Strait of Hormuz or attack U.S. forces on patrol. Iranian minelayers, submarines and missile-armed surface ships would be trapped in their ports or unable to return to them safely. Beyond that, mining Iran's oil-export terminals would impose considerable costs on the regime. According to the IMF, oil-export revenues account for more than 20 percent of Iran's $475 billion gross domestic product (GDP). Assuming that 80 percent of oil exports by sea can be halted by mines, and accounting only for lost oil profits, the net impact could be a loss of Iranian GDP equal to $59 billion over one year. This would be the equivalent of reducing Iran's GDP growth from today's 3 percent to around negative 12 percent.

Iran’s persistent resistance to the world pressure may be due to its real capabilities or it may be just a bluff. Israel and the US may actually attack Iran or are just arm-twisting it into submission. Who will call whose bluff is only a matter of time but the actual conflict will be catastrophic for both Iranian and American taxpayers.


Related link:
The Ticking Clock

Let us now focus on land-based, non-military operations to fight piracy….

Piracy off the Coast of Somalia has now become a serious threat for international security and the global economy. This piracy has endangered innocent mariners from countries around the world and jeopardized commercial shipping interests. The attacks by the pirates also pose an environmental hazard as ships may be damaged or purposely run aground by the pirates, thereby contaminating the seas, reefs, and coastal areas with dangerous pollutants. The cause of particular concern is the unhindered growth of this menace as the pirates have, in recent years, extended their attacks to the Gulf of Aden, between Yemen and Somalia's north coast. Subsequently, the pirates have been ranging farther out to sea -- up to 600 miles -- and now affect over 1 million square miles (2.59 million square kilometers) in the Gulf of Aden, the West Indian Ocean, and the Red Sea.

Somalia’s volatile economic, social, and political conditions that began in the mid-1990s are said to be the breeding ground for this menace. With the collapse of a central government and consequent weakening of country’s naval forces, some Somali fishermen took it upon themselves to protect Somali waters, and their economic interests, from over-fishing on one hand and illegal dumping on the other by foreigners. These vigilante actions led to piracy as a means to supplement livelihoods. Emboldened by the absence of an effective ruling authority, the piracy that stems from the coast of Somalia has been transformed into a highly organized and lucrative criminal business for its leaders and enablers. It has proved to be an attractive, though risky, alternative for some impoverished young men who have few if any options to a legal livelihood. That said, pirates are criminals motivated by a desire for quick money making Somalia less attractive as a place in which to invest and create employment.

Interestingly, most of the pirates are former fishermen, whose livelihoods were hurt by foreign ships illegally fishing in Somali waters. Others joined after seeing the profitability of piracy, since ransoms are usually paid. The piracy is also sponsored by the warlords  who split the profits with the pirates. Other cadres recruited for piracy include ex-militiamen, who previously fought for the local clan warlords, or ex-military from the former Barre government used as the muscle and technical experts, who operate equipment such as GPS devices. The pirates have been adequately trained   in weapons, engines and navigation.

The accumulated wealth of the pirates has generated some economic activity in the area and the local residents appreciate the rejuvenating effect that the pirates' on-shore spending and re-stocking has had on their impoverished towns, a presence which has often provided jobs and opportunity when there were none. Entire hamlets have in the process been transformed into veritable boomtowns, with local shop owners and other residents using their gains to purchase items such as generators -- "allowing full days of electricity, once an unimaginable luxury."

The mechanism of funding of piracy operations is interesting and has now been structured in a stock exchange, with investors buying and selling shares in upcoming attacks in a bourse. Ransom money is paid in large denomination US dollar bills. It is delivered to them in burlap sacks which are either dropped from helicopters or cased in waterproof suitcases loaded onto tiny skiffs. Ransom money has also been delivered to pirates via parachute, as happened in January 2009 when an orange container with $3 million cash inside was dropped onto the deck of the supertanker MV Sirius Star to secure the release of ship and crew. To authenticate the banknotes, pirates use currency-counting machines, the same technology used at foreign exchange bureaus worldwide. According to one pirate, these machines are, in turn, purchased from business connections in Dubai, Djibouti, and other areas. Hostages seized by the pirates usually have to wait 45 days or more for the ships' owners to pay the ransom and secure their release.

Somali pirates allegedly get help from the Somali Diaspora. Somali expatriates, including reputedly some among the 200,000 Somalis living in Canada, offer funds, equipment and information. Pirates' income from ransom has been estimated to be about 39 million euro (about $58 million) in 2009 and $238 million in 2010. However, indirect costs of piracy to the victims are much higher and estimated to be between $7 to 12 billion as they also include insurance, naval support, legal proceedings, re-routing of slower ships, and individual protective steps taken by ship-owners. Further, piracy in Somalia leads to a decrease of revenue for Egypt as fewer ships use the Suez canal (estimated loss of about $642 million), impedes trade with a number of countries such as Kenya and Yemen, and is detrimental to tourism and fishing in the Seychelles.

A 2011 report published by Geopolicity Inc, investigated the causes and consequences of international piracy, with a particular focus on piracy emanating from Somalia. The report asserts that piracy is an emerging market in its own right, valued at between US$4.9-8.3 billion in 2010 alone, and it establishes, for the first time, an economic model for assessing the costs and benefits of international piracy. This model provides a comprehensive, independent framework of trend analysis, whilst also highlighting where the greatest rates of return on international counter pirate investment and policy are to be found across what Geopolicity term the ‘Pirate Value Chain.’ The report states that the number of pirates could double by 2016, increasing by 400 each year. This is being fuelled by attractive financial incentives with Somali pirates earning up to US$79,000/year; equating to almost 150 times their country’s national average wage.

Piracy has developed into a complex and lucrative enterprise; its second and third-order impacts extend deep into Somali village structure and life. Piracy does not simply enrich individuals or pirate groups; it brings wealth to entire villages. Coastal villages make money by providing food to pirates and hostages who wait for negotiations to end favorably. Local negotiators make money by bringing the ship owners to pay the ransom money via a cash drop at sea or on land. Further, pirate financiers — in many cases, pirates themselves — invest in pirate crews who venture out to capture vessels on the high seas. The wives of these pirates receive compensation money before their husbands go out on a mission.  

Pirates are also provided with the necessary tools of the trade, such as satellite phones, global positioning systems (GPS) and weapons. Pirate financiers will spend as much as US$30,000 on a pirate group that “hunts” in the Indian Ocean, and upwards of US$10,000 on pirates operating in the Gulf of Aden.  And to protect themselves and their operations, pirates pay local militias (guns for hire) as much as US$10,000 per month to protect them from sub-clan rivals or external threats.

The booming business is profitable for all as the coastal villages around Haradheere receive around 5% of a total ransom payment simply for allowing pirated ships to anchor there.  All ransoms are paid in cash, and distributed between pirates, financiers, negotiators and local village elders.According to ongoing private sector research, the average “take” of pirates following the payment of a ransom is broken down as follows:

1. financiers (and sponsors) receive 50%;
2. the pirates, pirate commander, mother  ship crew and attack squads split 30%;
3. village elders receive 10%; and,
4. the security squad (guns for hire to protect hostages and vessels) receives 10%.

Interestingly, while the individuals who risk their lives on a piracy operation split 30% of the ransom money, the bankroller(s) ends up with 50% of the take.

To date, there is limited accessible research that identifies key pirate financiers and their associated business investments.  This represents a gaping hole in our counter-piracy approach, given that that some pirate financiers have invested in now thriving global businesses. However, as most pirate “soldiers” are illiterate, they are happy to receive large amounts of cash without knowing the true value of their services.

The system of piracy finance is wide and complex, both in terms of scope and impact. Once the international community better understands and identifies the “vertebrae” in this, the proverbial backbone of Somali piracy, the chances of combating it more effectively will drastically improve. Moreover, we will be better equipped to assist Somalis in replacing this illegitimate economic system with a more viable alternative. Doing away completely with the scourge of piracy off the East African coast is an extremely difficult proposition. However, there are a number of ways suggested by some research organizations that can address the problem more effectively than it has been to date.

According to these suggestions, it needs to be understood that piracy cannot be stopped at sea; it needs a comprehensive land-based solution. For this purpose, it is essential to deprive them of the economic incentives of piracy. The primary method to combat Somali piracy is to disrupt its economic system. Pressuring and disrupting the flow of finance to the pirates is essential. The international community must put a premium on identifying the key (Somali and non Somali) players that finance piracy, as well as conduct deep research to isolate and expose their investment patterns.

A number of governments are currently focusing on monitoring the hawalah systems – a traditional form of transferring funds found especially in the Middle East and parts of Africa – through which individuals who receive ransom cash have utilized in order to launder that money into “legitimate” businesses. With proper research, businesses that are using the hawalah systems for illegal ends (i.e. profiting from piracy) can be identified and action can be taken to stop their expansion. This, in turn, will pressure pirate financiers by virtue of removing their financial security blankets.

The supply line of the pirates can be choked and disrupted by identifying the areas where pirates buy their gear like equipment, weapons global positioning devices, satellite and mobile phones.

The international community, as part of measures to take away incentives should also offer alternative incentives. Finally, there must also be sufficient disincentives, backed by accepted and strengthened social (and political) authorities, to compel individuals to give up the business of piracy. The very attitudes, values and beliefs of piracy’s “culture” must be attacked from within by authoritative Somali voices.

Piracy is essentially not a military or national security issue; it involves bread and butter for a large part of Somali population. As it is economic issue in character, it cannot be addressed through employment of military might alone. This needs to be addressed through economic measures. Let us, therefore, shift our focus and fight piracy, not from sea but from land and that too from the economic front. As the economy of Somalia grows, young population gainfully employed in legal occupations and the investors and sponsors deprived of the return on their investment, the problem will be solved to a large extent.

The Velayat in the Strait of Hormuz is no ordinary war-games….

The world seems to be united to teach Iran a lesson it cannot afford to forget. Everyone, nearly everyone, has designs to strip Iran of its oil wealth to pressure it into submission on its nuclear program. But surprisingly, the isolated Iran is defiant and kicking. As Europe is working on a ban on importing oil from Iran and an amendment to the 2012 U.S. defense authorization bill seeks to close down transactions with Iran's Central Bank, there are other related developments taking place. China's leading refiner, Sinopec, halved its January purchases of Iranian crude on a dispute over credit terms, while Saudi supplies surged by a third. 

Everything is taking place to achieve the fundamental objective of the anti-Iran world: to narrow the circle of Iran's customers to China and a few others, giving them the ability to extract discounts and thus starving the Islamic Republic of revenue. But these are not the unilateral developments. While Iran is panic-stricken, it has created panic of the matching proportion for the world by officially commencing its 10-days war-games exercises, named as Velayat-e-90, in the Strait of Hormuz. 


The exercises could bring Iranian ships into proximity with United States Navy vessels in the area. "Velayat" is a Persian word for "supremacy" and it is currently used as a title of deference for the Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The war games cover a 2,000km stretch of sea off the Strait of Hormuz, northern parts of the Indian Ocean and into the Gulf of Aden, near the entrance to the Red Sea. It will be Iran's latest show of strength in the face of mounting international criticism over its controversial nuclear program, which the West fears is aimed at developing atomic weapons. This is a very significant development which means that, if pushed to the wall through international sanctions, Iran can block this most strategic waterway depriving the world of the precious commodity of oil passing through the Strait.

Located between Oman and Iran, the Strait of Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. Hormuz is the world's most important oil chokepoint due to its daily oil flow of 15.5 million barrels in 2009, down from a peak of 17 million bbl/d in 2008. Flows through the Strait in 2009 are roughly 33 percent of all seaborne traded oil (40 percent in 2008), or 17 percent of oil traded worldwide. On average, 13 crude oil tankers per day passed eastbound through the Strait in 2009 (compared with an average of 18 in 2007-2008), with a corresponding amount of empty tankers entering westbound to pick up new cargos. More than 75 percent of these crude oil exports went to Asian markets, with Japan, India, South Korea, and China representing the largest destinations. At its narrowest point, the Strait is 21 miles wide, but the width of the shipping lane in either direction is only two miles, separated by a two-mile buffer zone. The Strait is deep and wide enough to handle the world's largest crude oil tankers, with about two-thirds of oil shipments carried by tankers in excess of 150,000 deadweight tons.

Closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran will jolt the oil world as it would require the use of longer alternate routes at increased transportation costs. Alternate routes include the 745 mile long Petroline, also known as the East-West Pipeline, across Saudi Arabia from Abqaiq to the Red Sea. The East-West Pipeline has a nameplate capacity of 4.8 million bbl/d. The Abqaiq-Yanbu natural gas liquids pipeline, which runs parallel to the Petroline to the Red Sea, has a 290,000-bbl/d capacity.

A new bypass is currently being constructed across the United Arab Emirates. The 1.5 million bbl/d Habshan-Fujairah pipeline will cross the emirate of Abu Dhabi and end at the port of Fujairah just south of the Strait. Other alternate routes could include the deactivated 1.65-million bbl/d Iraqi Pipeline across Saudi Arabia (IPSA), and the deactivated 0.5 million-bbl/d Tapline to Lebanon. Additional oil could also be pumped north via the Iraq-Turkey pipeline to the port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean Sea, but volumes have been limited by the closure of the Strategic pipeline linking north and south Iraq.

According to a recent article carried by Foreign Policy, oil sanctions are a bad idea if they work, and a bad idea if they fail. If they work, American allies will be punished and some economically vulnerable countries, such as Greece, will suffer a cutoff of oil just at the time they can least afford it.Or, if they "succeed" more dramatically, and Iran's exports are really interrupted, oil prices will soar, plunging the world back into renewed recession. Tehran can also respond by sabotaging oil facilities in its Gulf neighbors and fomenting trouble via its proxies in Iraq's oil hub of Basra. An isolated Iran can afford to play such a dangerous game with the global economy.

But most likely, oil sanctions would fail, and a great deal of diplomatic capital will have been expended to no avail. Japan and South Korea, for instance, both rely on Iran for 10 percent of their crude imports, and waived oil sanctions. Turkey renewed its long-standing crude contract last Wednesday. And despite its incompetent response so far, Iran should be able to find ways round tightened oil sanctions -- barter trade, for example, or smuggling via Iraq and Pakistan -- with the assistance of ingenious sanctions-busters lured by lucrative deals. What it loses in discounts to China is largely made up by the higher prices these geopolitical tensions bring. The United States' last secret weapon -- embargoing gasoline shipments to Iran -- inspired Tehran to make its long-overdue subsidy reform and step up domestic refining capacity. In a way, the U.S. Congress did Iran a favor.

This imminent clash between Iran and international titans, apparently, makes no sense. The ultimate beneficiaries of the sanctions would not be US or Europe; it would surprisingly be the America’s rivals: China and Russia. Iran, a country with 2 percent of US GDP and 1.5 percent of its military budget, will prefer to tilt towards China even if it had to offer discounts on its oil sales. Meanwhile, Russia's Urals grade is, unusually, fetching higher prices than better-quality Brent oil as European refiners scramble for alternatives to Iran. And the Kremlin is glad to see the neutering of its greatest potential rival in the EU gas market.

Will the United States shoot itself in the foot through these sanctions? This question is not difficult to answer and immediate answer is in affirmative. The biggest lesson of history is that nations don’t learn any lesson. The cost of sanctions to the U.S. economy of expensive oil, was in the neighborhood of half a trillion dollars, caused by decades of sanctions on investment in Iran, Iraq, and Libya. The cost of the proposed sanctions is never mentioned.

But the sanctions and the escalating costs of transportation of oil due to Hormuz blockade by Iran would draw the US into another misadventure. This could destabilize the region further and transform it into breeding ground for US-hatred, extremism and terrorism. The Velayat in the Strait of Hormuz is no ordinary war-games and must be taken seriously.