India’s Scorpenes project runs into snags as its submarine fleet nears depletion….

Hussain Saqib

India’s plans to counterweight Pakistan’s submarine capability, and have an edge over China’s inferior submarine technology forced it to go for French submarine, a sister boat of Pakistan’s Agosta. But its plans have run into snags and have been severely frustrated. The blame has been laid at the door of “procurement bureaucracy” which is being targeted for a massive cost-escalation and huge time over-run which will seriously damage the combat capabilities of India Navy. On the strength of its Navy, India was poised to serve global American interests in Indian Ocean and, by extension, in the Pacific.

India may have acquired a nuclear-powered submarine of a very old Russian vintage, it only serves the purpose of power projection. The toothless power, so to say. But its project of development of conventional submarine, Scorpene, in India under a transfer-of-technology program is not faring any better. The whistle-blower report of India’s Auditor-General, the Controller and Auditor-General (CAG), raises alarms and concerns.

The report is clearly critical of the Scorpene acquisition. Indian Defense Minister had to admit to India’s Parliament that the project was running about 2 years behind schedule, due to “some teething problems, absorption of technology, delays in augmentation of industrial infrastructure and procurement of MDL purchased materials (MPM).” The CAG report criticizes the fact that the submarine requirement was approved in 1997, but no contract was signed until 2005, and then for only 6 of the envisioned 24 boats. Overall, the project cost had increased from Rs 12,609 crore in October 2002 to Rs 15,447 crore by October 2005 when the contract was signed. Once it was signed, the CAG believes that “the contractual provisions resulted in undue financial advantage to the vendor of a minimum of Rs 349 crore.”

The overall project, which includes a submarine construction facility at Mazagon Dockyards Ltd. (MDL), is placed at Rs 18,798 crore, or 187.98 billion rupees (currently about $4 billion). The Times of India believes that the final program cost will be over Rs 20,000 crore (currently about $4.3 billion), as the cost of key equipment that MDL shipyards needs is rising quickly. Rediff News notes other excerpts from the CAG report, adding that an accompanying Rs 1,062 crore deal for Exocet anti-ship missiles will have issues of its own:

“But even before the missiles become operational on the submarine, the warranty period of first two batches of the missiles supplied by the company would have expired, it added. India also extended to the [submarine] vendor “Wide ranging concessions” on warranty, performance bank guarantee, escalation formula, arbitration clause, liquidated damages, agency commission and performance parameters….”

The update on the project is that the program has been delayed several times and the price has gone up to $5 billion ($834 million each), a cost-over-run of 25%. While this effort will leave India with thousands of workers and specialists experienced in building modern submarines, all that will be wasted due to this delay. The deal was mismanaged to the extent that it is now three years behind schedule. But it is even more behind schedule if you count the several years delay in even getting started. The original plan was to have the first Indian built Scorpene delivered at the end of this year. But now, because of problems getting the construction facilities and skilled workmen ready, the first Scorpene won't be delivered until 2015, with one each year after that until all six are delivered. That schedule is subject to change, and probably will, for the worse. 

According to Strategy Page, this is a not a good news because India's submarine fleet is dying of old age and new boats are not going to arrive in time. The plan was to have a dozen new subs in service by the end of the decade. At present, there will be (with a bit of luck) six of them in service by then. The procurement bureaucracy is still seeking a supplier for the second six diesel-electric subs. There's some urgency to all this because this year, five of India's 16 diesel-electric subs (10 Kilo and two Foxtrot class Russian built boats and four German Type 209s) were to be retired (some are already semi-retired because of age and infirmity). Type 209s are being kept in service but not allowed out to sea much for several more years, because of project delay. That leaves India with 14 subs. But in the next year or so several of the older Kilos will reach retirement age. Thus, by the time the first Scorpene arrives in 2015, India will only have five or six working subs. India believes it needs at least 18 non-nuclear subs in service to deal with Pakistan and China. India is also building and buying nuclear subs. India received a Russian Akula nuclear attack (SSN) sub earlier this year. This one is on lease with the option to buy. Indian SSNs and SSBNs (missile carrying boats) are under development, as they have been for decades.

According to comparative technical details publically available, the Scorpenes are similar to the Agosta 90B subs (also French) that Pakistan bought in 1990s. The first of the Agostas was built in France, but the other two were built in Pakistan. The Scorpenes purchase was seen as a response to the Pakistani Agostas. The Scorpene are a more recent design, the result of cooperation between French and Spanish sub builders. The Agosta is a 1,500 ton (surface displacement) diesel-electric sub with a 36 man crew and four 533mm (21 inch) torpedo tubes (with 20 torpedoes and/or anti-ship missiles carried). The Scorpene is a little heavier (1,700 tons), has a smaller crew (32), and is a little faster. It has six 533mm torpedo tubes and carries 18 torpedoes and/or missiles. Both models can be equipped with an AIP (air independent propulsion) system. This enables the sub to stay under longer, thus making the sub harder to find. AIP allows the sub to travel under water for more than a week, at low speed (5-10 kilometers an hour). The Pakistanis have an option to retrofit AIP in their current two Agostas.

While India was largely concerned with the Pakistani navy when the Scorpene contract was negotiated and signed, China is now seen as the primary adversary due to a new role assigned to India by the US. The Chinese subs are not as effective as the Pakistani boats; both because of less advanced technology and less well trained crews. India could use their Scorpenes to confront any Chinese attempt to expand their naval presence into the Indian Ocean. Thus the delays and cost overruns with the Scorpenes are causing quite a lot of commotion in India. But at the rate India is going, it will be nearly a decade before all six of the Scorpenes are in service. At that point, India would have about a dozen subs (including nuclear powered models under construction). China will have over 60 boats, about 20 percent of them nuclear. China does have a lot for its warships to deal with off its coasts and in the Western Pacific but it does retain the capability of putting more subs off the Indian coast than can the Indian Navy.

What are the short-term objectives of Baloch insurgents?

Pakistan’s populist Supreme Court is seized with the issue of insurgency in Balochistan. Every word of observations that the honorable judges utter during the proceedings turns into music for anti-Pakistan media. It is the very same media which has launched campaign against Pakistan in general and its security forces in particular. The basis for the sinister campaign is perceived brutalities of the security forces in Balochistan.

Balochistan, Pakistan’s largest province, is no ordinary piece of land; its geographical location and its untapped mineral reserves make it a target of special interest among players of regional politics including the US, India, former Soviet Union, UAE and even Afghanistan. All these countries have one converging interest in Balochistan; the province should become an independent state in their geo-strategic interests. Located very close to the oil lanes of the Persian Gulf and having a common border with Iran and Afghanistan, Balochistan is strategically very important. Commanding almost the entire coast of the country – 470 miles of the Arabian Sea, and boasting of a deep sea port recently completed with Chinese assistance at Gwadar, Balochistan comprises 43 per cent of Pakistan’s total area but is home to just over five per cent of the population, 50 per cent of which are ethnic Pakhtuns. Balochistan has always been ruled autocratically by sardars (tribal chiefs) who have kept their people backward, illiterate and deprived.

These sardars have been extorting billions each year from big corporations, federal government and equal billions in the name of development funds. They remain up in arms against the government to keep the funds flowing. Their other sources of funding are money from regional players channeled as donations. Mainly three sardars of Bugti, Marri and Mengal tribes have been in revolt against the federation from time to time. These sardars used to inflame nationalist sentiments and demand for greater provincial autonomy and control over the province’s natural resources developed into a demand for independence. The armed insurgent group, Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) has been active in acts of terrorism to keep the province destabilized for various long-term and short-term objectives which serve the interests of sole civil power and the states under its influence.

According to Institute for Study of Violent Groups, BLA was formed in 1999 and has 500 active members. Like many guerrilla and terrorist groups, the BLA has a structure comprised of both paramilitary and cellular components. The majority of the organization is composed of various units assigned to different training camps under various leaders, but some are assigned to urban cells and are responsible for the planting of explosives and reconnoitering targets. Some of the cells are ad hoc and once a BLA member has completed a mission, he may return to his paramilitary unit. There is no shortage of weapons in Balochistan available to the militants; many are regularly supplied from across Pakistan-Afghanistan border courtesy a host of “consulates” established for this very purpose. Other weapons are left over from previous conflicts in Afghanistan.  Common weapons in the region include Russian Kalashnikovs, RPGs (rocket propelled grenades), and various types of land mines.

Pakistan has always asserted that an “outside hand” is playing a role in the Baloch insurgency, though conclusive determinations are difficult to come by. One of the most widely cited examples of outside aid occurred in 1973 when Pakistan authorities entered the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad and uncovered a small arsenal of weapons, including 300 submachine guns and 48,000 rounds of ammunition. Akbar Bugti extended a helping hand in dismissal of ANP government and was made governor as a reward. He is the one who supervised the worst military operation against the insurgents. The government claimed that the arms were destined for Balochistan; these accusations were never proven. 

The BLA is not believed to have an organized recruitment effort in place; rather, the group is capitalizing on popular sentiment in the province and giving Balochs with nationalist tendencies a way to fight back at the government. The chief means of attracting poor, uneducated Baloch youths are the dozens of training camps believed to be in operation in the province. The group’s targeting and tactics are designed to reduce the economic incentive for the central government’s presence in the province.  Accordingly, sites where natural resources are harvested by the government are the most common target; these include natural gas pipelines and oil fields.  Soldiers and civilians working in government capacities in Quetta are also prominent targets, in addition to journalists.  The BLA has shown equal proficiency with both bombings and armed assault, though it appears that members prefer the use of RPGs as opposed to planted explosives, some of which appear to have been planted by younger members with little or no insurgency experience.

The insurgents and their sponsors may have disintegration of Pakistan and establishment of an independent state of Balochistan as their long-term objective but their short-term objectives are very clear; closing down of deep-sea port of Gwadar and failing Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project. India and UAE have direct stakes in the first objective whereas the US does not want to allow the pipeline project to go ahead. Gwadar port has both strategic and commercial implications for UAE and India. Chinese involvement in building the port, aimed at generating economic activity in Balochistan and facilitating the Chinese to import oil and raw materials from the Middle East and Africa and export goods through a land corridor extending from Gwadar to China’s Sinkiang province, became the sore of many eyes. An oil refinery in Gwadar and recovering huge mineral deposits in the province to serve as the precursor of another enormous economic opportunity – a trade corridor for Central Asia, particularly for its oil and gas.

Dissident sardars rose up in arms in an effort to destroy the project and its profound impact on Balochistan’s economy for fear of losing their hold on the people. In a sustained campaign, aided and abetted by outside interests opposed to Gwadar port, fears were expressed that this was an effort to colonize Balochistan. In this backdrop, a low intensity insurgency festered in Balochistan for a few decades now.

India began meddling in Afghanistan in the mid-1970s in the post-Bangladesh era. By fostering an insurgency, India tried the same model in Balochistan – exploiting the disaffection between the state and the dissident sardars. The aim was to deny Pakistan the energy resources, bleed it economically, and fragment it ultimately. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) – the most active insurgent group today, made its debut in 1973. Arms from the former Soviet Union found their way into the province and many insurgents were clandestinely trained and educated there. Down the road India became concerned at the development of Gwadar port which, besides making the Baloch people economically independent, was to be of strategic importance to the Pakistan Navy. India did not like the Chinese presence at Gwadar as this was to interfere with its desire of controlling the Indian Ocean region with its upcoming blue water navy. Leaders of Baloch insurgencies have publicly listed India among their sponsors. Brahamdagh Bugti, a BLA leader, said that he accepted assistance from India and Afghanistan to defend the Baloch nationalist cause.

Baloch Media Network quotes Wahid Baloch, President of Baloch Society of North America, as saying, “We love our Indian friends and want them to help and rescue us from tyranny and oppression. In fact, India is the only country which has shown concern over the Baloch plight. We want India to take Balochistan’s issue to every international forum, the same way Pakistan has done to raise the so-called Kashmiri issue. We want India to openly support our just cause and provide us with all moral, financial, military and diplomatic support.” Not to be left behind was the former RAW agent B. Raman who wrote this to Sonia Gandhi: “struggle for an independent Balochistan is part of the unfinished agenda of the partition”. With Afghanistan coming under US occupation, Mossad, MI6 and the CIA jumped into the fray with an agenda of Greater Balochistan, providing new partners to India.

Small pockets of local resistance mushroomed into organized foreign funded, armed groups, which were discretely supported by the three dissident tribal chiefs. As a hub for joint operations, India established a ring of 26 consulates along the Balochistan border in Afghanistan and Iran that began funding, training and arming the dissidents.

Interestingly, major stakeholders of insurgency are not the common people of Balochistan. The insurgent groups are led by the scions of the three rebel chiefs who are in line to succeed their aging patriarchs. The movement offers no substitute to the Sardari system. By creating instability through acts of terrorism they hope to chase the Chinese away and create obstacles for the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline, which is opposed by Washington.

According to the analysis of Baloch Media Network, the selection of targets and use of modern weapons demonstrates quite clearly that the dissidents have been trained by military experts. Insurgencies of this magnitude cannot last without very large funds that the insurgents cannot raise on their own. According to an estimate the financial outlay for BLA alone is 50-90 million rupees per month. Reportedly, massive cash is flowing into their hands from Afghanistan through American defence contractors, CIA foot soldiers and free lancers. The Americans have developed an interest in Balochistan for several reasons. It is the only available route for transportation of oil and gas from Central Asian and Caspian Sea region after alternate routes via Russia or China were not found feasible. Then Balochistan itself had an estimated 19 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves and six trillion barrels of oil reserves in addition to gold, copper and other minerals, making it attractive for exploration. Like the Indians, the Americans also did not like the Chinese breathing down their neck in Gwadar – so uncomfortably close to the oil lanes of the Straits of Hormuz and the US bases in the Indian Ocean, although at no point did Pakistan and China contemplate Gwadar to become a Chinese military base. Balochistan shares a long border with Iran along Iranian Balochistan, which is inhabited by a large Baloch population.

Look at the demand of Baloch sardars which was accepted for political expedience; remove army cantonments and garrisons from Balochistan. The armed forces are virtually absent from Balochistan yet they are held accountable for act of brutality unleashed by the terrorists. The BLA have all the characteristics of a foreign funded terrorist organization. It has massacred thousands of innocent civilians simply in order to spread fear and keep the province destabilized to serve foreign interests. Its victims include Punjabi settlers and even Baloch youth itself. Its tactics are the very same employed by Mukti Bahini in East Pakistan insurgency. They kill, loot and vandalize in the garb of security agencies’ personnel and successfully manipulate the obliging media. Yet it has not been declared a terror outfit because it is sponsored by CIA, MI5 and RAW besides intelligence agencies of UAE and Afghanistan. The reasons are obvious.

RealPolitik: Pakistan reaches out to Russia to change the contours of a unipolar world.....

HUSSAIN SAQIB

When President Putin postponed his visit to Pakistan in 2012, the most jubilant countries were India and the US but it was subsequently revealed that this postponement did not mean anything to lift the spirits of Cold War adversaries now turned into allies. The on-going visit to Russia by Gen Raheel Sharif, Pakistan's most powerful stakeholder is a sufficient indication of realpolitik. Cold War adversaries are switching partners and the events are unfolding so swiftly that it has become difficult to keep track of who will be whose friend after Americans pack up from Kabul and leave. One thing is for sure; foes of yesterday will be compelled by the realities of realist politics of today to switch sides and embrace each other.

Russia of today is the successor of Soviet empire of yester-years, though reduced to much smaller in size. Russia, and then the USSR, which played for centuries the Great Game for gaining influence and foothold in Central Asia and get a direct access to Kabul finally lost the Game to the West in the battlefields of Afghanistan. Along with this defeat, it also lost its imperial glory by ceding a sizable portion of its territory to independent Central Asian States. It, however, seems that it never gave up its ambitions on Afghanistan; it has been watching with amused interest the plight of NATO forces in Afghanistan. It had read the writing on the wall and was confident that NATO would not meet a fate different from what it itself encountered after a decade-long war of 1980s.

Russia under Putin has revived its hope in Afghanistan and is moving to deepen its geo-economic ties with South Asia as a whole, with Pakistan serving as a gateway for energy trade to the entire subcontinent in advance of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan in 2014. Badly bruised by harsh treatment meted out by the Americans, Pakistan feels compelled to look towards not only its old friend China but also its longtime adversary, Russia. If India after having been in the cold during Cold War can warm up to the US, why can’t Pakistan hope to be friends with Russia? This is what the realist politics is all about. For Pakistan, Russia can not only help the civilian government in Islamabad to shore up its economic record, it can also offer an alternative source of military hardware to the country’s armed forces. Diversifying its sources of military supplies has taken on new-found importance for Islamabad given Washington’s increasing reluctance to supply the full spectrum of arms and China’s continued inability to meet all of Pakistan’s requirements.

To understand the potentials of Pak-Russia friendship, we will have to make an assessment of the present state of US-Russia relations. This subject has dominated the foreign policy debates of both the major contenders of power in next presidential elections of the US which are just round the corner. The Obama administration is being harshly criticized by the opponents for its increased focus on its Pacific Century and allocation of future military and political resources to contain China. In their view, Russia under president Putin is a much greater threat to American ambitions than China. According to Foreign Policy, Russia is the major counterweight to American power and influence. A huge country that straddles what the great geographer Halford Mackinder called the Eurasian “heartland” is sure to operate with substantial effect in the world. A country with thousands of nuclear weapons, still-substantial armed services, and a cornucopia of natural resources will have its innings in high politics. Republican presidential candidate, Romney’s assertions about Russia should be seen less as stale strategic thinking and more as a critique of Barack Obama’s looming “Pacific shift,” which implies that China has moved into position as our top geopolitical foe. Yet Beijing, in the throes of modernization and heavily weighed down by a massive population, increasingly urgent energy needs, and a troubled political transition can hardly be seen as new No. 1 geopolitical foe of the US.

According to this analysis, China’s military is still decades away from having any kind of ability to project force over meaningful distances. The 100-mile width of the Taiwan Strait could just as easily be a thousand miles, given China’s lack of force-projection capability. Even the quite large People’s Liberation Army is full of question marks, with few substantive changes evident since it got such a bloody nose during the 1979 war with Vietnam. To be sure, the Chinese navy is very innovative, with its emerging swarms of small, short-ranging missile boats. And Chinese hackers are among the best in the world. But these capabilities hardly form the leading edge of a global military power.

This, by implication, suggests that with Russia’s greater capabilities, and intentions so clearly and so often inimical to American interests, the smart geopolitical move now would be for Washington to embrace Beijing more closely, giving Moscow a lot more to think about on its eastern flank. This was a strategic shift that worked well for President Richard Nixon 40 years ago, when he first played “the China card”; it might do nicely again today.

The present US-China relations do not suggest any potential conflict given the fact that U.S. trade with China amounts to more than half a trillion dollars annually — more than ten times the level of Russo-American economic interaction. And Beijing also serves as a major creditor. It simply makes little sense to provoke China, as Obama’s announced Pacific shift already has. If Romney is right about the return of post-Soviet Russia as the world’s bête noire, then any American Pacific shift should be more about alliance with, rather than alienation of, Beijing.

The Russian stance on the issues of US intervention in Syria for regime-change clearly suggest the divergence of interests of both the countries. With reinstallation of president Putin in Moscow, hopes that Russia will support any American initiative are fading away. According to a report by Brookings, the US has a list of demands which Russia may not accept. These include further reductions of nuclear arms, including non-strategic nuclear weapons; a cooperative NATO-Russia missile defense arrangement; joint efforts to deal with the proliferation challenges posed by North Korea and Iran; and consultation on steps to bolster security and stability in Central Asia as the NATO coalition prepares to withdraw its military forces from Afghanistan. The United States is trying to explore ways to increase trade and investment relations with Russia, which could help build a foundation for a more sustainable relationship.

President Putin’s re-election is considered a major challenge to smooth-sailing from the American point of view. Mr. Putin spent his formative years in the 1980s as a KGB officer. As his rhetoric during the election campaign made clear, he holds a wary skepticism about U.S. goals and policies. For example, his comments suggest he does not see the upheavals that swept countries such as Georgia, Ukraine, Tunisia or Egypt as manifestations of popular discontent but instead believes they were inspired, funded and directed by Washington. This may seem like a paranoiac view, but Mr. Putin has made so many allusions to it that it is hard to conclude that he does not believe it. That is a complicating factor for the bilateral relationship.

According to Brookings, Mr. Putin’s experience as president dealing with the Bush administration was not a happy one. In 2001-02, he supported U.S. military action against the Taliban, including overruling his advisers to support the deployment of U.S. military units into Central Asia; shut down the Russian signals intelligence facility in Lourdes, Cuba; agreed to deepen relations with NATO; calmly accepted the administration’s decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; and agreed to a minimalist arms control agreement that fell far short of Moscow’s desires. In his view, he received little in return. His perception is that Washington made no effort to accommodate Moscow’s concerns on issues such as the future of strategic arms limits, missile defense deployments in Europe, NATO enlargement, relations with Russia’s neighbors in the post-Soviet space or graduating Russia from the Jackson-Vanik amendment.

As against yesterday, Mr. Putin faces a tougher opposition at home. Soviet and Russian leaders in the past resorted to the image of a foreign adversary—all too often the United States—to rally domestic support, and one can see aspects of that in Mr. Putin’s campaign rhetoric. But the constituency to whom that appeals is already largely on Mr. Putin’s side. He may conclude that he can focus better on his domestic challenges if his foreign policy results in more positive relations with countries such as the United States. The upshot is that Mr. Putin’s return can and probably will mean more bumpiness in the U.S.-Russia relationship. He will pursue his view of Russian interests. On certain issues, those will conflict with U.S. interests, and Washington and Moscow will disagree, perhaps heatedly.

In this state of US-Russia relationship, Pakistan sees its opportunity in warming up to Russia after 2014. Despite postponement of much-awaited visit of president Putin to Pakistan,the two significant visits of Pakistan’s army and air chiefs to Russia give some indications of the future Pakistan-Russia relations.

According to an assessment of warming up Pakistan-Russia relations carried out by Reuters, bilateral visits alone don’t transform ties, and especially ones with a troubled history behind them. And then there is India to be factored in, both for Russia and Pakistan.  Moscow has long stood in India’s corner from  the days of the Cold War to its role as a top weapons supplier to the Indian military, still ahead of the Israelis fast clawing their way into one of the world’s most lucrative arms markets. A nuclear-powered submarine has just sailed from Russia to be inducted into the Indian navy - a force-multiplier in the military with the sub’s ability to stay beneath waters long and deep and far from home. But the stepped up Russia-Pakistan diplomacy suggests a thawing of ties at the very least. And at another level, by raising the quality and quantity of these exchanges, is Russia signaling it will pursue a multi-vectored policy in a fast changing South Asia? Tanvir Ahmad Khan, a former Pakistani foreign secretary who was also once the country’s ambassador to Moscow, says the two countries are on the verge of ending a “long history of estrangement” and that two factors have led to this landmark development. One is that there is now a national consensus in Pakistan to engage Russia earnestly, and two, “Vladimir Putin’s Russia has read the regional and global scene afresh and recognized Pakistan’s role as a factor of peace and stability.”

Pakistan’s compulsion to diversify its foreign partners lies in its present ties with the United States which have soured so much that Pakistan can no longer be considered as an ally, ready to do its bidding as in the proxy war against the Red Army in Afghanistan. And India’s ties with the United States, on the other hand, have been transformed, with Washington virtually legitimizing it as the world’s sixth nuclear weapon state, something that even Russia never went as far to support during all the years as close allies. And if India and the United States are holding ever so advanced  joint military exercises (there is one going on now in the Rajasthan desert which has a border with Pakistan) and considering multi-billion dollar defense deals as part of a new booming strategic relationship, Russia and Pakistan are also looking at launching  military exchanges. Last year the commander of the Russian ground forces, Col-Gen Alexander Postinov, was in Pakistan and according to Pakistani newspapers discussed with Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani the possibility of expanding defense ties by holding joint military exercises, exchanging trainees and trainers and selling and buying weapons, although it seems these were to be confined to counter-terrorism equipment.

It may be interesting to know that the 50 JF-17 Thunder fighter planes that China is supplying to Pakistan use a Russian engine, and it’s likely that Russia gave the green signal for China to go ahead. New Delhi was probably not impressed, but it has kept its silence. Russia is also reported to have indicated its willingness to get involved in the 1,640 km TAPI project bringing piped gas from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and into energy-starved Pakistan and India, a project that has been hanging fire for years. Russian investors were also interested in the Thar coal project which involves developing a large energy complex in Sindh province to produce 6,000 MW of coal-based power and introduce to the country the concept of gasification and production of liquid fuel from coal.

Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan make a difficult triangle….

Hussain Saqib

Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia make a very complex triangle of relationships. Unfortunately, Pakistan can enjoy good relationships with only one of them. Our strategic compulsions, however, do not allow us to abandon any one of them. Iran is Pakistan’s Western neighbor and sits on the periphery of Pakistan’s most troubled province, Balochistan. Iran has a Balochistan of its own and figures in the international conspiracies to carve out an Independent Balochistan comprising Pakistani and Iranian Balochistan. Jundullah, an anti-Iran terrorist group operating from Pakistan is sponsored and funded by the CIA. Pakistan has to collaborate with Iran to fight and neutralize separatist elements in Balochistan.

Iran holds the key to regional peace; Afghanistan being center of gravity. Iran has its stakes and influence in non-Pashtun Afghanistan. It has military ties with India and its Chabahar port, very close to Gwadar, was built by India to encircle Pakistan, in line with its strategic objectives. If Pakistan antagonizes Iran, it risks increased Indian influence on its West and South-West. It will be a tough task with India all poised to assume greater role in Afghanistan after NATO drawdown of troops. It may be kept in mind that in order to develop Chabahar port, India has already built road infrastructure on Iran-Afghanistan border spending $750 million which will provide an access to Central Asia from Iran and neutralize the positive outcome of Gwadar port for Pakistan. It is for this reason that India and US are investing funds in Balochistan insurgency to prevent Pakistan and China from taking advantage of Gwadar. Gwadar will only be useful after Pakistan build roads and rail infrastructure in Balochistan which, given the intensity of insurgency, is not possible for Pakistan anytime soon.

Pakistan’s geo-strategic location is very interesting. It is very close to the mouth of Strait of Hormuz and every ship carrying all oil for East of Pakistan passes through North Arabian Sea i.e. Pakistan’s territorial waters. Any tension in the region and an imminent clash of interest of the world with Iran will direct impact Pakistan’s economic, political and strategic stability.

Pakistan is an energy deficient country. The natural answer to this problem is import of gas from Iran for which IPI (Iran-Pakistan-India) gas pipeline project was initiated. Fearing incidental benefits of this project to China and also under US pressure, India is already out of this project. Pakistan is also under immense US pressure to abandon the project and concentrate on a very unfeasible TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) gas pipeline project. Pakistan has yet not abandoned IP project and is a target of fury of US and its allies. Though Pakistan is still a part of the deal but its lukewarm response is already frustrating Iran.  Any delay in launching the pipeline project will cost Pakistan Iran’s goodwill

Another difficult development is Iran’s pursuit of its nuclear program. This also threatens the regional peace with India and Pakistan already in possession of nuclear capabilities. Iran’s nuclear program threatens Israel and the US-Israel nexus can go to any limit to deprive Iran of this capability.

This is where the Saudi strategic interests figure in. Saudi Arabia has been Iran’s traditional adversary. These adversarial relationships were under wraps prior to 1979 when both the countries were America’s Cold War allies but the these adversarial relationships intensified after Iran was ruled by religious clergy whose religious beliefs are opposed to those of Saudi Arabia. Both the countries have not fought any war so far but they are in proxy war since 1979 and the battle field, unfortunately, has been Pakistan. Sectarian violence intensified in Pakistan causing deaths and bitterness and polarizing Pakistani society. Saudi Arabia does not approve of Pakistan’s close relations with Iran and tries to drive wedge between the two neighboring countries. Increased attacks on Hazaras of Balochistan and other Shia pilgrims by pro-Saudi extremists outfits is a clear indication that Saudi Arabia can go to any limit to teach Pakistan a lesson for its Iran relations.

Iran’s nuclear program is viewed a direct threat, not only to Israel but also Saudi Arabia and its allies. Recent troubles in Bahrain against the ruling regime supported by Saudi Arabia triggered under Iranian influence played a great part in further worsening Iran-Saudi Arabia relationships. It is generally assumed that any possible strike on Iran’s nuclear installations will have a tacit approval and support of Saudi Arabia. There were rumors in the recent past that Saudi Arabia had offered Israel to use its airspace for aerial attacks on Iran.

Pakistan’s economy depends on Saudi Arabia in more than one ways. Nearly 60% of foreign remittances, a life blood for Pakistan’s economy, come for Pakistani diaspora working in Saudi Arabia and its allied countries. These workers not only bring petro-dollars, they also harbor close sympathy with these Arab countries. This gives a great leverage to Saudi Arabia to meddle in Pakistan’s affairs directly and also through right-wing clergy funded by Saudis. This clergy was strengthened in Afghan jihad through massive donations which promoted Wahabi Islam and its violent side in Pakistan. The extremists in Pakistan are still sympathetic to Saudi Arabia and derive strength from its religious policies of intolerance.

In addition to this, Pakistan has to depend on Saudi oil to power its economy which is available on deferred payments. Saudi Arabia is practically a US-satellite country. Pakistan often uses Saudi influence to reach out to the US in difficult times. Like other financial institutions, Saudis also extend economic cooperation to Pakistan when it is approved of by the US.

Saudis are suspicious of the current regime in Pakistan and are apprehensive of its pro-Shia policies. They think that PPP government is playing a dual role; trying to please both Iran and Saudi Arabia. The space created by this suspicion is proactively being filled by India which worries Pakistan. Saudi Arabia was visibly unhappy over the closure of NATO supplies for such a long period. The Saudi decision to hand over Mumbai attack suspect to India was pressurize Pakistan to come to terms with the US, and by implication with Saudi Arabia.

This situation is a cause of concern for Pakistan’s security establishment. It cannot afford to annoy Saudi Arabia for economic and political reasons. Warming up of Saudis to India is another cause of concern. As for Iran, it was never a reliable friend for a variety of reasons but it could have been kept in good humor had Saudi-Iran standoff not caught Pakistan. India is building bridges with Pakistan’s friends; Afghanistan is already hostile and has traditionally been a safe haven for anti-Pakistan elements of all hues, including Baloch nationalists. In this situation, Iran can be a source of more worries if it keeps annoying international community. It could be even more worrisome if it repairs its relationship with India after the recent banning of Iranian oil in Indian waters and India’s jumping the IPI ship.

Pakistan Affairs: Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan....

Galbraith was the original author of Indo-US nuclear cooperation in 1962…..

The United States encouraged India in early 60s to develop a nuclear device to fight China without comprising its commitments as a Soviet ally. In the era of Cold War, as we all know, India was a bitter opponent of the USA and a close ally of USSR. India remained staunch ally of USSR till disintegration of the Soviet empire in 1991. During Afghan jihad (1979-89), when Afghans were fighting Soviet occupation forces with the help of Pakistan, US and Saudi Arabia, India was a sworn enemy of the US. Due to its alliance with USSR, India was a target of Afghan fury during and after the jihad. In fact, Taliban regime which came into being after departure of Soviet Army was opposed to India and was allied with Pakistan. It was due to pro-Pakistan regime in Afghanistan that the country was considered a strategic depth by Pakistani strategists.

Americans are, however, warming up to India in spite their past relations. This warming up is taking place at the expense of Pakistan which has so far remained more allied than the NATO allies of the US. Some analysts dub this sudden change of hearts as a compulsion of realist politics; Pakistan has outlived its utility after Afghanistan end-game and the US needs India to contain China in the Pacific.

But it has now been emerged that the US was trying to win Indian hearts from the very beginning. There are two factors which brought the two countries together; John Kenneth Galbraith, the American Ambassador to India appointed by President Kennedy and India’s humiliating defeat in Indo-China War of 1962. Galbraith befriended Nehru during his tenure. He rendered great help to India in its hour of distress and kept Pakistan away from taking advantage of India fragile position as a result of devastating defeat at the hands of Peoples Liberation Army.

It was the same Ambassador Galbraith who was very close to former Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. This friendship was carried forward by his son Peter W Galbraith till Benazir's tragic assassination.

According to an article by Bruce Riedel, an analyst and a career CIA officer in The National Interest, Indi-China war also posed a crisis for America’s young president, John F. Kennedy, who had entered office determined to build a strong U.S. relationship with India. But his attention that fateful autumn was diverted to a more ominous crisis—the one involving Soviet efforts to place nuclear missiles in Cuba—that unleashed a dangerous nuclear face-off with the Soviet Union. Thus, Kennedy confronted two simultaneous crises, one far overshadowed by the other at the time and also later in history.

According to this article, when Kennedy became president in January 1961, the United States and India were estranged democracies. In the 1960 presidential campaign, Kennedy promised a departure from Eisenhower’s foreign policy and as a senator had sponsored legislation to increase food aid to India. And so it wasn’t surprising that as president he sought to woo India and its leader, Jawaharlal Nehru, into a closer relationship with Washington that didn’t require any formal anticommunist commitment from India. He sent his friend John Kenneth Galbraith to New Delhi as U.S. ambassador. Like presidents before and after, he tried to befriend both India and Pakistan and had invited Pakistan’s president Mohammad Ayub Khan to visit the United States twice during his thousand days in office. The Kennedy team hailed Pakistan as a reliable ally against communism and a model for development in the Third World.

But it was the India relationship that most preoccupied Kennedy as he contemplated U.S. relations with South Asia. Galbraith’s appointment put a Kennedy man and a firm advocate of his New Frontier at the center stage of U.S.-Indian relations. No president since has sent such a close friend and high-powered representative to New Delhi as ambassador.

According to Bruce Riedel, the most important development in the relationship emerged with the Chinese invasion of India in October 1962 to seize control of territories it claimed along the 3,225-kilometer border. The Chinese forces, superior in leadership and weapons, routed the Indian Army, which retreated in confusion from the Himalayas. The situation was most precarious in India’s easternmost regions, which were linked to the rest of the country only by a narrow land connection north of what was then East Pakistan. After maintaining its neutrality in the Cold War for fifteen years, India found itself the victim of a Chinese invasion it was powerless to halt. Nehru was devastated. He reluctantly turned to the United States and Britain, asking for immediate supplies for the Indian Army. In his panic, he also requested the deployment of American bombers to repulse the Chinese advance. America unexpectedly found itself arming both Pakistan and India, with no assurance they would not use the weapons against each other.

It is clear from Galbraith’s diary that Washington was surprised by the Chinese invasion. But, with the U.S. bureaucracy fixated on the life-and-death duel over Cuba, Galbraith was given almost no instructions from the White House or State Department during the key period of the Indo-Chinese crisis. Thus, he became the main decision maker on the American side, a role he relished. Working closely with his British counterpart, as U.S. diplomats typically do in South Asia, Galbraith fashioned a response that backed India and delivered much-needed military assistance to the Indians. Once a request for aid was formally transmitted, the first American shipments of military support arrived by air four days later. British support came as well.

Chinese intentions were impossible to decipher. After their initial victories, they paused for several weeks. Then they attacked again with devastating results, driving the Indians back in the East. Had they pressed on in the most vulnerable sector, they could have cut off Assam and eastern India and linked up with East Pakistan. Even Calcutta was at risk. Nehru asked for more aid—a dozen squadrons of American fighters and two squadrons of bombers—to redress the imbalance. In his desperation, he sought direct American military intervention, at least in the air. This would have meant war with China.

There ensued many anxious moments in New Delhi, Washington and London until China unilaterally announced a cease-fire on November 19, 1962. Kennedy never had to answer the request for air power. The war was over; India was humiliated; Nehru was devastated. But U.S.-Indian relations were better than ever before. America’s approval ratings among Indians soared from 7 percent at the start of the war to 62 percent at the end.

Galbraith’s Memoirs make it clear that, even as he faced the Chinese threat, he had to devote an equal measure of his energy and skill to managing Indo-Pakistani relations. Pakistan promptly sought to exploit India’s distress. Ayub’s government suggested to the American embassy in Karachi that Pakistani neutrality in the war could be assured by Indian concessions in Kashmir. Implicitly, an Indian refusal would bring Pakistan into the war. China tried to sweeten the deal by offering a nonaggression pact with Pakistan. Galbraith writes that throughout the crisis:

My concern . . . was about equally divided between helping the Indians against the Chinese and keeping peace between the Indians and Pakistanis. . . . The nightmare of a combined attack by Pakistan and China, with the possibility of defeat, collapse and even anarchy in India, was much on my mind.

In short, at a defining early moment in U.S.-Indian relations, when China and India were military adversaries, America found itself trying to manage the Indo-Pakistani rivalry to avoid Armageddon in India. Pakistan was outraged that America was arming its rival and wanted to be bought off in Kashmir. Working with his American and British counterparts in Karachi, Galbraith persuaded India and Pakistan to begin a dialogue on Kashmir. Nehru reluctantly agreed. Galbraith describes him as a much-diminished prime minister. He had devoted his entire life to Indian independence but now was forced to rely on Washington and London. American C-130s were delivering vital military aid, and an American aircraft carrier, USS Enterprise, was visiting Madras to show tangible support.

Galbraith suggested to Kennedy in one of his private letters that the United States and United Kingdom seize the opportunity to quietly move toward a Kashmir settlement. Galbraith opposed a territorial settlement; he envisioned a much more subtle deal that would transform the entire nature of South Asian politics, a fundamental rapprochement based on regional cooperation that would make Kashmir largely irrelevant.

JFK was determined to keep a strong alliance with Pakistan even as he improved ties with India. But as U.S. arms flowed to India in the wake of the Chinese invasion, the U.S.-Pakistani connection began to sink. Islamabad did not want an ally that armed both sides. It had not joined SEATO and CENTO to see American arms flowing to its archrival, India. Ayub feared the American arms sent to India were rapidly diminishing his qualitative advantage over his rival, and he was right.

Not surprisingly, Pakistan turned increasingly to China. After the border agreement, Pakistan signed an aviation agreement with the Chinese, which broke an American-inspired campaign to isolate that communist nation. Pakistan International Airlines began regular flights between Dacca and Shanghai. The Kennedy team responded with the first of what would become a long list of sanctions on Pakistan—canceling a deal to upgrade the Dacca airport.

The Sino-Indian war had one other major consequence: India moved closer to its decision to develop a nuclear deterrent. Nehru had begun a nuclear-power program early after independence and acquired reactors from the United States and Canada. But he insisted India would use them only for peaceful purposes. His worldview held the use of nuclear weapons to be unthinkable. But in the wake of the Chinese invasion, the first Indian voices emerged in favor of a nuclear-weapons program. The opposition party called for the development of the bomb to deter further Chinese aggression. Nehru still demurred, but the path to a peaceful nuclear-explosive test had begun.

Meanwhile, the Americans also came to realize that the United States and India likely would need the bomb in order to stop another major Chinese invasion. In 1963, Kennedy met with his military advisers shortly before his death to review options in the event of another Chinese attack. Secret tapes record Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara telling Kennedy, “Before any substantial commitment to defend India against China is given, we should recognize that in order to carry out that commitment against any substantial Chinese attack, we would have to use nuclear weapons.” Kennedy responded, “We should defend India, and therefore we will defend India if she were attacked.”

THE KENNEDY era underscores several key points about U.S. diplomacy in South Asia. First, it is virtually impossible to have good relations with both India and Pakistan. We may want them to stop being rivals, but they can’t escape their history and geography. Almost every American president has sought to have good ties with both, though none really has succeeded because it is a zero-sum game for two rivals who cannot abide America being their enemy’s friend. When we give one country a substantial gain, like the 2005 U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement, the other feels hurt and demands equal treatment.

Second, China is our rival for influence in the region because it has the capacity to frustrate American goals. For Pakistanis, China is the “all-weather friend” that they can rely on, unlike the unreliable and quixotic Americans. China provided Pakistan with key technology to build the bomb in the 1970s while America was trying to prevent Pakistani acquisition of nuclear weapons. Today, Beijing is building new reactors to fuel the fastest-growing nuclear arsenal in the world in Pakistan.